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TRANSPARENCY IN FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
David S. Han*
ABSTRACT
The broad tension between rule-like categorical approaches and standardlike balancing approaches to doctrinal design has been a longstanding issue
within First Amendment jurisprudence. Since each approach has its benefits
and costs, First Amendment doctrine has sensibly evolved into a hybrid
framework that incorporates both approaches in different contexts. This
Article evaluates the extent to which current doctrine has successfully
integrated the two approaches. In other words, does our doctrinal framework
optimally maximize the benefits associated with abstract rule-like approaches
and open-ended balancing approaches?
This Article focuses on one particular dimension of this broad theoretical
question: the idea of doctrinal transparency. When doctrine is transparent, it
encourages or forces courts to analyze cases openly, in a fashion that elicits
direct discussion of foundational speech value and speech harm issues. Such
transparency is particularly valuable within the First Amendment context,
where difficult or novel questions of speech value and harm are often avoided
or distorted by doctrinal formalities and empty sloganeering. Tough First
Amendment cases are valuable opportunities for forthright discussions—
amongst courts and within society at large—that seek to clarify in nuanced
terms why exactly we value speech and the extent to which we are willing to
tolerate speech-based harms. At the same time, however, doctrinal
transparency cannot be the sole consideration in designing First Amendment
doctrine, since such transparency often carries costs in the form of diminished
predictability and consistency.
Through this lens of doctrinal transparency, this Article analyzes two
distinct areas of First Amendment doctrine touched upon in recent Supreme
Court cases: the historical test for low-value speech set forth in United States
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. Many thanks to Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Doug Kmiec, Frederick Schauer, Alexander Tsesis, and the participants of the 2015 Randolph W.
Thrower Symposium at Emory University School of Law for their valuable thoughts and feedback. All errors
and omissions are my own.
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v. Stevens and its progeny, and the longstanding default rule that strict
scrutiny applies to content-based speech restrictions that underlay the Court’s
decisions last Term in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar and Reed v. Town of
Gilbert. I argue that the Court has struck the wrong doctrinal balance in these
areas, sacrificing the substantial benefits of doctrinal transparency in
exchange for a comparatively lesser gain in predictability and consistency. I
then suggest some doctrinal adjustments that would better capture the
significant benefits associated with doctrinal transparency at limited cost.
INTRODUCTION
Designing First Amendment doctrine1 is a tricky business. On the one
hand, the doctrinal framework can be broadly conceptualized as a set of
foundational balancing judgments. The Free Speech Clause is ultimately
rooted in a longstanding, constitutionally enshrined intuition that speech has
special value that affords it greater protection than other types of conduct.2 But
at the same time, speech can cause a wide variety of social harms, ranging
from hurt feelings to criminal violence.3 One of the fundamental goals of First
Amendment doctrine is to reconcile these two aspects of speech: to capture our
basic intuitions as to what exactly makes speech constitutionally valuable and
how that value ought to be weighed against different types and degrees of
social harm.4 And these intuitions are, in turn, driven by the foundational
rationales for extending special protection to speech, such as speech’s role in
uncovering truth, its necessity as a means of effectuating democratic selfgovernance, and its status as a significant aspect of individual autonomy.5
1 I use the term “First Amendment” throughout this Article to refer specifically to the First
Amendment’s protection of free speech, not the First Amendment as a whole.
2 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 8 (1982) (“When there is a
Free Speech Principle, a limitation of speech requires a stronger justification, or establishes a higher threshold,
for limitations of speech than for limitations of other forms of conduct. This is so even if the consequences of
the speech are as great as the consequences of other forms of conduct.”).
3 See Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1106 (1979) (observing that
speech can “offend, injure reputation, fan prejudice or passion, and ignite the world”).
4 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 792–93 (2d ed. 1988) (“[D]eterminations
of the reach of first amendment protections . . . presuppose some form of ‘balancing’ whether or not they
appear to do so. The question is whether the ‘balance’ should be struck for all cases in the process of framing
particular categorical definitions, or whether the ‘balance’ should be calibrated anew on a case-by-case
basis.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth
Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 276 (2009) (“[W]e built First Amendment doctrine backwards—not from
theory to doctrine to results, but from intuited results to doctrine, with only passing attention to theory.”).
5 See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1989)
(“The protection of freedom of speech can be seen instrumentally as furthering some background justification,
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On the other hand, the practical imperatives of designing effective First
Amendment doctrine dictate that courts cannot simply apply this foundational
balancing judgment in an ad-hoc manner to every individual First Amendment
case. Such limitless balancing would leave judicial discretion unchecked,
which could lead to unpredictable and inconsistent results, which could in turn
lead to significant chilling effects.6 Abstract, categorical rules that are simpler,
more predictable, and easier to apply work to constrain not only the
inconsistency driven by the judges attempting to apply open-ended standards
in good faith, but also the conscious and unconscious biases that might affect
such judges, particularly amidst strong majoritarian pressures.7
This broad tension between rule-like categorical approaches and standardlike balancing approaches has been recognized since the earliest days of
modern First Amendment jurisprudence.8 The result of this tension has been a
First Amendment jurisprudence that mixes categorical approaches with more
open-ended balancing approaches—a hybrid framework that makes practical
sense, since each approach has its benefits and costs, and certain contexts are
more amenable to one approach over the other.9 The practical question that I
explore in this Article is whether current First Amendment doctrine has done a
good job of integrating the two approaches. That is, does our doctrinal

or rationale, or goal. . . . Whatever the goal may be, . . . the special protection for speech fosters something,
some justification.” (emphasis omitted)).
6 See Stone, supra note 4, at 275–76 (characterizing ad-hoc balancing as “fatally unpredictable” because
“its application would produce a highly uncertain, unpredictable, and fact-dependent set of outcomes that
would leave speakers, police officers, prosecutors, jurors, and judges in a state of constant uncertainty”).
7 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
449, 450 (1985) (observing that “repressive dynamics may penetrate the judicial psyche and cause judges to
interpret the first amendment restrictively”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 46, 73–74 (1987) (“There is a danger . . . that judges and jurors may be influenced by their own
conscious or unconscious biases, which may undermine their ability to evaluate accurately and impartially the
extent to which particular content-based restrictions actually impair the communication of specific, often
disfavored, messages.”).
8 This tension was most notably encapsulated in the debate between Justice Hugo Black, who argued for
an absolutist approach to free speech, and Justice Felix Frankfurter, who favored a balancing approach.
Compare Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 67 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
balancing approach “undermines the very foundation upon which the First Amendment, the Bill of Rights,
and, indeed, our entire structure of government rest”), with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524–25
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the
interest in national security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests,
within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian
problems to be solved.”).
9 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 7, at 72–77 (outlining why evaluating content-neutral speech restrictions is
more amenable to balancing approaches than evaluating content-based restrictions).
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framework optimally maximize the benefits associated with abstract, rule-like
approaches and open-ended, balancing approaches?
This Article focuses on one particular dimension of this broad theoretical
question—the idea of “doctrinal transparency”10—and it analyzes a number of
recent Supreme Court decisions through this lens. When doctrine is
transparent, it encourages or forces courts to analyze cases openly, in a fashion
that elicits direct discussion of foundational speech value and speech harm
issues. Thus, doctrinal transparency can be viewed as a countervailing force
against abstract rule creation, trading off simplification and abstraction for a
direct foundational analysis of speech value and harm.
Doctrinal transparency is particularly valuable within the First Amendment
context, where difficult or novel questions of speech value and harm are often
avoided or distorted by doctrinal formalities and empty sloganeering.11 Tough
First Amendment cases are valuable opportunities for forthright discussions—
amongst courts and within society at large—that attempt to clarify in nuanced
terms why exactly we value speech and the extent to which we are willing to
tolerate speech-based harms. While transparent approaches may not
necessarily guarantee a clearer or more coherent doctrinal framework, they
establish the conditions under which such clarity and coherence can emerge, as
they lay bare the fundamental value judgments and empirical assumptions
underlying courts’ decisions. At the same time, however, the substantial value
of doctrinal transparency must be measured against its costs in terms of
predictability and consistency. If doctrinal transparency were the sole
consideration, then courts would presumably adopt an individualized, ad hoc
balancing approach in every case, which would be practically unmanageable
and, to most, philosophically undesirable.12
Through this lens of doctrinal transparency, this Article analyzes two
distinct areas of First Amendment doctrine touched upon in recent Supreme
Court cases: the historical test for low-value speech set forth in United States v.
10 I use the term “doctrinal transparency” for the sake of simplicity and consistency; the idea itself is a
well-established one. See, e.g., Dennis, 341 U.S. at 524–25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (describing the value
of “candid and informed weighing of the competing interests” in First Amendment doctrine); see also
Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2225–26 (2015) (stating that
a purpose-based approach to delineating low-value speech “would ensure much greater doctrinal transparency
by allowing courts to articulate the value judgments that in fact inform their decisionmaking”).
11 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The First Amendment as Ideology, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 866
(1992) (“With numbing frequency, the same platitudes and slogans substitute for argument whenever the
subject of free speech arises within those institutions dependent on free speech for their existence.”).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 36–47.
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Stevens13 and its progeny, and the longstanding default rule that strict scrutiny
applies to content-based speech restrictions that underlay the Court’s decisions
last Term in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar14 and Reed v. Town of Gilbert.15 In
these two areas, the Court has adopted largely opaque doctrinal approaches
that discourage courts from participating in candid, direct discussions of
fundamental free speech values. I argue that the Court has struck the wrong
doctrinal balance in these areas, sacrificing the substantial benefits of doctrinal
transparency in exchange for a comparatively lesser gain in predictability and
consistency. I then suggest some doctrinal adjustments that would better
capture the significant benefits associated with doctrinal transparency at a
limited cost.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I lay the theoretical foundation
for my discussion by describing the interplay between foundational balancing
and abstract rule-creation in First Amendment doctrine. I then outline the
substantial benefits associated with transparent First Amendment doctrine,
which provides courts—and, by extension, society at large—with valuable
opportunities to discuss difficult foundational questions of speech value and
harm in a frank and open manner. As I observe, however, there are also costs
associated with transparent doctrinal approaches, which must always be taken
into account in identifying the contexts in which transparent doctrine can be
most valuably deployed.
In Part II, I examine a set of recent Supreme Court decisions addressing
two distinct areas of First Amendment doctrine: the test for identifying
unprotected low-value speech, and the longstanding default rule that strict
scrutiny applies to content-based restrictions on speech. In analyzing these
cases, I outline the significant costs associated with the Court’s adoption of
largely opaque doctrinal approaches in these areas. In Part III, I argue that the
Court’s chosen doctrinal approaches in these areas fail to capture the optimal
balance between doctrinal transparency and opacity; in other words, the Court
has sacrificed, to some extent, the substantial value of doctrinal transparency
for comparatively small or nonexistent gains in predictability and consistency.
As such, I propose some doctrinal adjustments that would better capture the
benefits of such transparency at limited cost. Part IV concludes.

13
14
15

559 U.S. 460 (2010).
135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
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I. THE VALUE OF DOCTRINAL TRANSPARENCY
A. The Foundational Balancing Inquiry Underlying First Amendment
Doctrine
The First Amendment’s protection of free speech represents a
constitutionally enshrined recognition of the idea that speech carries special
value. Practically speaking, the Free Speech Clause has meaning only insofar
as speech is entitled to a greater degree of protection than non-speech
conduct.16 So the root of understanding the First Amendment—and, in turn, the
root of all First Amendment doctrine—is the various theoretical reasons as to
why speech is entitled to such special protection.
Scholars and commentators have long offered a multitude of rationales for
granting special protection to speech. Three particular rationales have
generally dominated debates regarding First Amendment theory.17 The first—
most commonly associated with John Stuart Mill—is the idea that free speech
is valuable as a means of pursuing truth.18 This theory is perhaps most
famously encapsulated by Justice Holmes’s statement that “the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”19 The second rationale—most commonly associated with Alexander
Meiklejohn—is that free speech is a necessary component of democratic selfgovernance.20 Under this view, citizen-sovereigns in a democracy must have
the freedom to propose and debate public issues in order to govern themselves
effectively.21 The third rationale is that freedom of expression is a good in
itself, simply because it is an essential aspect of individual autonomy and
personhood.22 This rationale is built on the idea that “[o]ur ability to deliberate,
16
17
18

See SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 8.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15–16 (2d ed. 2003).
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 87 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003)

(1859).
19

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22–27
(1948); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011) (“In my
view, the best possible explanation of the shape of First Amendment doctrine is the value of democratic selfgovernance.”).
21 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 26 (“When men govern themselves, it is they—and no one else—
who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that unwise ideas must
have a hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as well as safe, un-American as well as
American.”).
22 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964,
966 (1978); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
20
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to reach conclusions about our good, and to act on those conclusions is the
foundation of our status as free and rational persons.”23
Other rationales for protecting speech have been proposed as well,
including promoting tolerance, checking government abuse, and acting as a
“safety valve” to vent anger and frustration.24 And scholars have long debated
whether the First Amendment should be conceptualized—either descriptively
or prescriptively—as advancing a single rationale for protecting speech, or
whether it is better understood as encompassing an eclectic set of overlapping
and sometimes conflicting rationales.25
The theoretical underpinnings of the First Amendment have been the
subject of extensive scholarly debate, and my purpose here is not to argue for
or against any particular theory or overarching conception of the First
Amendment. But these fundamental rationales for protecting speech—whether
viewed individually or in combination—ultimately represent the foundation for
delineating the scope of First Amendment coverage and protection. They are
the starting point for answering the basic question underlying much of First
Amendment jurisprudence: how exactly should we value speech in delineating
the scope of First Amendment protection?
The fundamental First Amendment calculus, however, does not focus on
the value of the speech alone. On the other side of the ledger, the value of
speech must be balanced against the social harm that is caused by the speech.26
This harm can take many forms, from hurt feelings to moral offense to
financial loss to criminal violence, and the ways in which we evaluate and
measure the social harms resulting from speech are also rooted in our
underlying normative rationales for protecting speech. For example, under the
democratic self-governance theory, we might completely discount listeners’
moral offense to the content of another person’s speech as a valid speech-based
225, 233 (1992); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213–15
(1972).
23 Fried, supra note 22, at 233.
24 STONE ET AL., supra note 17, at 15–16.
25 See David S. Han, The Value of First Amendment Theory, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS 87, 88–
91 (describing this debate).
26 I do not mean to imply that the First Amendment must be conceptualized in purely consequentialist
terms. A rights-based theory of free speech does not necessarily require that such rights trump regulatory
interests at all costs; consequences may still be taken into account. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme
Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 52–53 (1998)
(“Rights . . . are not trumps in the sense that they exclude all consideration of consequences. Instead, they are
at most ‘shields’ against weak or unacceptable reasons for government action.” (footnote omitted)).
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harm to be weighed in the balancing calculus. Recognizing such offense as a
“harm” offsetting the value of speech would be incompatible with the
underlying premises of the self-governance theory, which emphasizes the need
to hear out all ideas, whether broadly offensive or not27—even though, in a
broader sense, moral offense does constitute a form of social disutility.
Once the value and the harms associated with speech are identified, there is
the matter of calculating the scope of speech value or speech harm associated
with particular speech. These determinations are often premised on broad
empirical judgments and assumptions that rest on intuition rather than data or
hard facts. For example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny, the
Supreme Court determined that robust constitutional protection in the area of
libel was necessary to prevent crippling chilling effects on the press.28 Whether
the Court’s empirical judgment on this question was correct or not, it was
premised solely on the Court’s intuition rather than “hard facts,” as Justice
White observed in a later dissent.29 These sorts of intuition-based empirical
judgments abound throughout First Amendment doctrine, from broad
judgments like the Court’s assumption that speakers confronted with offensive
and potentially hurtful speech can limit the harm caused to them by simply
“averting their eyes”30 to case-specific judgments as to how audiences would
respond to a particular instance of speech.31
It is worth clarifying, however, that the “value” and “harm” sides of the
equation often blend together, both on an abstract level and in the context of
formal First Amendment doctrine. For example, all of the designated “lowvalue” categories of speech—such as fraud, true threats, and obscenity—are
defined, at least in part, in terms of the social harm that they cause.32 When we
conceive of certain speech as more or less valuable, some aspects of that
determination may rest on innate characteristics of that speech,33 while others

27

See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 26.
376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964); see, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
29 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 390 (White, J., dissenting) (“I know of no hard facts to support [the Court’s]
proposition, and the Court furnishes none.”). Indeed, Justice White adopted a different empirical assumption,
observing that “[t]he press today is vigorous and robust” and finding it “quite incredible to suggest that threats
of libel suits from private citizens are causing the press to refrain from publishing the truth.” Id.
30 See David S. Han, The Mechanics of First Amendment Audience Analysis, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1647, 1705–10 (2014).
31 See id. at 1680–82.
32 See id. at 1672.
33 For example, valuing political speech above commercial speech because of political speech’s singular
importance in promoting democratic self-governance.
28
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may rest on the speech’s association with socially harmful consequences.34
Thus, throughout this Article, when I discuss the “value” of speech, I am often
referring to value in a broad sense—that is, as a synthesized judgment taking
into account both the innate characteristics of the speech that render it more (or
less) worthy of protection and the speech’s association with socially harmful
consequences.
Thus, the scope of First Amendment protection—and First Amendment
doctrine in general—largely rests on a set of fundamental intuitions. These are
basic intuitions as to why exactly we value speech, the extent to which certain
speech generates different types and degrees of social harm, and how willing
we are to tolerate the social harms associated with speech when measured
against the value of speech. Although this foundational balancing analysis is
not the only relevant inquiry in First Amendment analysis,35 the “correct”
results in many First Amendment cases are broadly driven by this foundational
balancing analysis, and all of these fundamental intuitions are ultimately rooted
in the underlying rationales for protecting speech—the reasons why we
attribute special value to speech—and the underlying empirical judgments we
make regarding the scope of the value and harm associated with speech.
B. Rules and Standards in Doctrinal Design
If First Amendment doctrine can largely be conceptualized as balancing the
value we attribute to speech against the social harms associated with speech,
then why not simply design First Amendment doctrine to apply this
foundational balancing analysis in each individual case? The obvious answer is
that this sort of ad hoc balancing would be practically unworkable: balancing
in every case would lead to unchecked judicial discretion, which would lead to
unpredictable and inconsistent results, which would in turn lead to significant
chilling effects on speech.36 As a result, First Amendment doctrine has evolved
34 For example, valuing true threats less than political speech because true threats create harmful social
consequences in the form of particularized fear and terror.
35 Other considerations, such as the motive of the government in enacting a speech regulation, might
come into play as well, and may in fact be of paramount importance in certain doctrinal contexts. See, e.g.,
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 426 (1996) (stating that under a motive-based view of the First Amendment,
“an action may violate the First Amendment because its basis is illegitimate, regardless of the effects of the
action on either the sum of expressive opportunities or the condition of public discourse”); id. at 422
(observing that in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, “the crux of the dispute between the majority and the concurring
opinions concerned the proper understanding of St. Paul’s motive in enacting its hate-speech law”). Although
motive analysis is not my primary focus in this Article, I touch on it below. See infra Section II.B.
36 See Stone, supra note 4, at 275–76.
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into a mix of rule-like approaches, like the default rule that content-based
speech restrictions are evaluated under strict scrutiny,37 and standard-like
approaches, like the intermediate scrutiny standard applied to content-neutral
speech restrictions.38
There are of course good reasons for courts to adopt this mixed approach in
crafting First Amendment doctrine. Such design reflects a series of judgments
based on the trade-offs that always exist when deciding between clear and
easy-to-apply rules on the one hand and open-ended standards on the other.
Under the basic narrative of the rules versus standards framework, rules, in the
abstract, premise legal outcomes on clear, objective, and easy-to-apply criteria.
Thus, they do more to cabin judicial discretion, leading to more predictable
and consistent outcomes; these predictable and consistent outcomes, in turn,
allow people to conform their behavior accordingly.39 On the other hand, rules
are by nature over- or under-inclusive, and they are rigid, leading to anomalous
outcomes in certain cases.40
Standards, on the other hand, premise legal outcomes on more open-ended
and evaluative considerations.41 Standards thus allow for equitable flexibility:
they allow decision-makers to exercise discretion in considering the context
and circumstances of each case and to make tailored judgments.42 Such
37 See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.”).
38 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
39 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 384–85 (1985); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 62–63 (1992).
40 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1689 (1976) (“The choice of rules as the mode of intervention involves the sacrifice of precision in the
achievement of the objectives lying behind the rules.”); Sullivan, supra note 39, at 58 (“A rule necessarily
captures the background principle or policy incompletely and so produces errors of over- or underinclusiveness. But the rule’s force as a rule is that decisionmakers follow it, even when direct application of
the background principle or policy to the facts would produce a different result.”). For example, a hard speed
limit of 65 miles per hour is easy to administer and apply. Its administrability, however, is a product of its
rigidity; such a law would not account for other relevant factors such as weather conditions, the amount of
traffic on the road, or emergency circumstances, and thus would be either over- or under-inclusive in different
situations.
41 See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 39, at 400.
42 See, e.g., id. at 385 (“By describing the distinction between permissible and impermissible conduct in
evaluative terms, standards allow the addressees to make individualized judgments about the substantive
offensiveness or nonoffensiveness of their own actual or contemplated conduct.”); Sullivan, supra note 39, at
58–59 (“Standards allow the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the
circumstances.”).
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flexibility, however, sacrifices predictability and consistency, which may deter
risk-averse people from partaking in socially useful activities.43 It also
challenges the rule-of-law ideal, which “incorporate[s] some notion of
constraint, of rules fixed in advance which guide decisions and behavior.”44
Adopting administrable rules rather than foundational balancing in First
Amendment cases therefore ensures a greater degree of predictability and
consistency, which is of particular importance given the costs associated with
chilling effects in the speech context.45 If speech provides special social value
beyond that associated with other types of conduct—such as revealing truth or
promoting democratic self-governance—then a general move towards a rulebased approach makes sense, since such rules, even if they are by nature overor under-inclusive, nevertheless limit the extent to which speakers may be
chilled from partaking in valuable speech.46 Furthermore, a rule-based
approach, at least in theory, constrains judges from succumbing to personal
biases or majoritarian pressures, particularly in “pathological” times “when
intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are
most able and most likely to stifle dissent systematically.”47
In order for a rule to work effectively in a First Amendment context,
however, it has to walk a fine line. On the one hand, it must largely track our
intuitions regarding foundational questions of speech value and harm, such that
it produces correct answers in most cases.48 On the other hand, a good rule
43 See Schlag, supra note 39, at 385; Sullivan, supra note 39, at 62 (“Standards produce uncertainty,
thereby chilling socially productive behavior.”). If, for example, drivers are told merely that they cannot drive
at a “speed no greater than is reasonable”—an actual standard used in Montana in the 1990s, see MONT. CODE
ANN. § 61-8-303 (1995)—such a law would theoretically lead to more correct outcomes on a case-by-case
basis, since a decision-maker could take into account all relevant factors: the driver’s speed, weather
conditions, traffic congestion, and so forth. On the other hand, it would give decision-makers broad discretion,
which would lead to unpredictable results, which might in turn deter risk-averse drivers from driving fast even
when it is useful and proper for them to do so.
44 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV.
961, 991 (1998).
45 See David S. Han, Rethinking Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1160–61 (describing
the mechanics of chilling effects).
46 See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265, 306 (1981) (“We must sacrifice the advantages of dealing with the full variety of cases in optimum
fashion in order to achieve the advantages, in terms of learnability, of general principles.”).
47 Blasi, supra note 7, at 449–50.
48 See Schauer, supra note 5, at 9 (“When we instantiate a justification, whether with a rule or with a
right, we believe that the instantiation will indicate, at least probabilistically, the results that direct application
of the background justification would generate.”); Stone, supra note 4, at 278 (discussing courts’ adoption of
targeted First Amendment rules, in the hope that such rules “would approximate the results of ad hoc
balancing”). For example, a rule establishing absolute protection for all speech produced by people whose last
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should also depart sufficiently from the underlying balancing inquiry such that
it can be applied more easily and predictably. In other words, a good rule must
provide a good fit such that it produces largely correct results, but it cannot be
a perfect fit—otherwise, it would simply be replicating the underlying
foundational balancing analysis with no gains in predictability or
consistency.49 Rules can collapse into the background justifications underlying
them in many different ways: perhaps the rule was poorly crafted and provided
courts with substantial discretion;50 perhaps what started as a simple rule
became riddled with so many formal exceptions that it now effectively
resembles the underlying standard;51 or perhaps decision-makers found ways to
surreptitiously avoid enforcing the rule in situations where it seemed unwise to
do so.52
Adopting a rule or a standard in designing doctrine thus necessarily
requires making a trade-off. A rule sacrifices case-by-case flexibility for
simplicity, predictability, and consistency of application, while a standard
makes the opposite trade-off. An administrable rule thus always produces some
degree of formal arbitrariness, since faithful application of it will necessarily
lead to some incorrect outcomes, while a standard always produces the
arbitrariness inherent to more open and unconstrained judicial discretion. The
choice between a rule or a standard is, at its root, a judgment as to which form
of arbitrariness poses the greater danger in a given doctrinal context.53

names begin with the letter “C” is both predictable and easy to apply, but we would of course deem it a poor
rule, since it would do a bad job of producing the correct answers we would theoretically reach by applying the
foundational balancing analysis in all such cases.
49 See Schauer, supra note 5, at 17 (observing that in crafting rules, “we accept the benefits of
comparative closeness of getting it right in exchange for the aspirations of getting it right all the time . . . for
that aspiration can be served only by avoiding the rule and applying the background justification directly to the
diversity of experience”).
50 See infra Section II.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s historical approach to identifying low-value
speech categories).
51 For example, the extremely rigid traditional rule of contributory negligence—under which the
plaintiff’s own negligence forfeited any recovery—was softened by a number of exceptions and sub-rules
before the majority of states simply adopted the far more standard-like comparative negligence regime. See,
e.g., McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tenn. 1992) (listing multiple doctrinal exceptions to
contributory negligence); id. at 55–56 (abandoning contributory negligence to become the forty-sixth state to
adopt comparative negligence).
52 See infra Section II.B.2 (describing ways in which courts have distorted doctrine in order to avoid
applying true strict scrutiny to certain content-based speech restrictions).
53 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 40, at 1689 (“If we adopt the rule, it is because of a judgment that this
kind of [formal] arbitrariness is less serious than the arbitrariness and uncertainty that would result from
empowering the official to apply the standard of ‘free will’ directly to the facts of each case.”); Sullivan, supra
note 39, at 62 (“A decision favoring rules thus reflects the judgment that the danger of unfairness from official
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C. The Value of Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine
Tied into this broad rules-versus-standards narrative is the idea of doctrinal
transparency. This Article uses this term to describe the extent to which
doctrine encourages or forces courts to analyze cases openly, in a fashion that
elicits direct discussion of foundational speech value and speech harm issues.
Thus, in a rough sense, doctrinal transparency can be viewed as a
countervailing force against abstract rule-creation.
In delineating what I mean by doctrinal transparency, it’s worth clarifying a
couple of points. First, doctrinal transparency, as I frame it, is not a binary
quality; transparency and opacity describe two different directions on a broad
spectrum.54 A doctrinal framework can be fully transparent, partially
transparent, not transparent at all, or anywhere in between.55 So in discussing
transparent versus opaque doctrinal approaches, I am generally describing
different frameworks in terms of relative degrees of transparency rather than
on a simplified binary basis.
Second, doctrinal transparency in the First Amendment context is broadly
associated with the “standards” side of the rules-versus-standards debate, since
standards generally “make visible and accountable the inevitable weighing
process that rules obscure.”56 Theoretically speaking, however, it may not
always track the rules–standards distinction, since the degree of
transparency—at least as I conceptualize it—ultimately rests simply on the
extent to which courts directly discuss foundational questions of speech value
and harm. Courts might adopt a standard that is opaque in operation, in that it
allows them to ignore fundamental questions of speech value and harm,57 or
they could craft a rule such that its application is directly and openly linked to

arbitrariness or bias is greater than the danger of unfairness from the arbitrariness that flows from the grossness
of rules.”).
54 The same is true of the rules-versus-standards distinction. See Sullivan, supra note 39, at 61 (“These
distinctions between rules and standards, categorization and balancing, mark a continuum, not a divide.”).
55 See infra note 153 (observing that a categorical balancing approach is relatively transparent compared
to a strict rule-based approach, but less transparent than an ad-hoc balancing approach).
56 Sullivan, supra note 39, at 67.
57 Consider, for example, the standard that “speech is protected if that is the right thing to do.” This is, in
essence, a completely open-ended and unconstrained balancing inquiry that gives courts ample room to avoid
the sorts of foundational speech value and harm judgments described above. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Balancing,
Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text, 4 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 34, 36–37 (2010) (“There
is a difference between the structured inquiry of proportionality review and an open-ended mandate simply to
‘do the right thing,’ or ‘take everything into account,’ or make the best decision on the ‘balance of reasons.’”).
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an underlying judgment of speech value and harm.58 For practical purposes,
however, I will treat the opacity–transparency spectrum as broadly reflecting
the rules–standards spectrum; in other words, I will assume that any balancing
approaches proposed are appropriately crafted to focus courts’ attention on
foundational questions of speech value and harm, along with any other
theoretically relevant considerations.59
The value of doctrinal transparency60 lies in the fact that it pushes courts to
directly articulate and wrestle with the foundational intuitions regarding speech
value and speech harm that underlie their decisions in speech cases.61 This
value is particularly important in the First Amendment context, where rigorous
analysis is often sidestepped in favor of hollow abstractions and empty
sloganeering.62 Doctrinal transparency thus represents a vital means for driving
the evolution and development of these fundamental intuitions, particularly as
58 Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s broad rule that speech on matters of public concern is
entitled to greater protection than speech on matters of private concern—a value judgment that flows directly
from the democratic self-governance theory of free speech. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–
16 (2011); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (plurality
opinion).
59 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 35, at 427–37 (discussing the significance of illicit government motive in
First Amendment analysis).
60 To be clear, my focus here is solely on the value of doctrinal transparency in the First Amendment
context—that is, crafting doctrine that encourages or forces courts to discuss foundational speech value and
speech harm issues directly. Although my discussion of transparency here reflects some of the broader
arguments made in favor of judicial candor in the abstract, see, e.g., David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial
Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (“[J]udges who regard themselves as free to distort or misstate
the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest disclosure of
their motivation may entail.”), I do not purport to make any broad theoretical arguments or claims regarding
the overarching value (and possible limits) of candor in judicial decision-making—an issue that has been the
subject of extensive academic debate. See, e.g., Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 297–98
(1990) (distinguishing between candor and introspection and exploring “whether judges ought to decide
candidly but nonintrospectively”); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1307, 1310 (1995) (arguing that judges “may regularly forgo candor under the principles of logic and
prudence”); Shapiro, supra, at 750 (“[A] good case can be made that the obligation to candor is absolute.”);
Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 (1994) (“Courts and judges always lie.
Lying is the nature of the judicial activity. . . . Judges necessarily lie because that is the nature of the activity
they engage in.”). This far more expansive and abstract question involves additional considerations that lie
beyond of the scope of this Article. For present purposes, it suffices to say that in this specific and limited
context, the abstract value of doctrinal transparency is, I think, largely apparent, even if one might have qualms
as to the extent to which such transparency ought to be deployed within the doctrinal framework. See infra text
accompanying notes 89–90.
61 See Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF.
L. REV. 821, 825 (1962) (“Open balancing compels a judge to take full responsibility for his decisions, and
promises a particularized, rational account of how he arrives at them . . . .”).
62 See id. (observing that “[o]pen balancing” produces analyses that are “more particularized and more
rational” than “the familiar parade of hallowed abstractions, elastic absolutes, and selective history”).
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social and cultural norms shift and novel speech issues arise. It is, in other
words, an essential means for courts—and, by extension, society in general—
to test and work out the basic intuitions as to why we value speech and how
that value compares to the different harms associated with speech.
By forcing courts to visit (or revisit) these fundamental questions,
transparent doctrine spurs courts to continuously review the efficacy of
existing rules by reevaluating the extent to which they fit our normative and
empirical intuitions regarding speech value and harm.63 Transparent
approaches also ensure that courts have the opportunity to deliberate and think
through these foundational intuitions in the abstract, particularly when novel
issues arise. They provide courts with the opportunity to directly scrutinize and
shape the foundational intuitions that, in the end, are a prerequisite for good
First Amendment doctrine, whether that doctrine is in the form of strict rules or
more open-ended standards.
The value of doctrinal transparency can therefore be conceived as tracking
the traditional First Amendment principle that open deliberation is both the
best means of arriving at truth and an essential requirement for making
reasoned collective decisions.64 If First Amendment rules are only as good as
the foundational intuitions of speech value and speech harm underlying them,
then what is the best way to capture and work through these intuitions? Based
on the underlying premises of the truth-seeking theory of free speech, perhaps
the best way for courts to work out these intuitions is to openly discuss them in
deciding difficult cases; this sort of open clash of differing ideas may well lead
to a general consensus, as sounder views survive in the marketplace of ideas
and weaker ones fall away.
Similarly, if working out these fundamental intuitions regarding speech
value and harm is conceptualized as a form of collective decision-making, then
63 See id. at 825–26 (stating that an “open balancing” approach “should make it more difficult for judges
to rest on their predispositions without ever subjecting them to the test of reason” and “also make their
accounts more rationally auditable”).
64 The broad value of open deliberation, whether in the development of social norms or in aiding the
discovery of truth, is most notably propounded in the work of deliberative democracy theorists like Jurgen
Habermas. See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996). As Richard Schragger has noted, “The
literature that arguably fits under the umbrella of deliberative democracy is varied and has been given a
number of names, such as proceduralist-deliberative democracy, participatory democracy, communicative
democracy, and civic republicanism.” Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371,
399 n.101 (2001) (listing theorists that fall under this umbrella, such as Habermas, Benjamin Barber, Frank
Michelman, and Cass Sunstein).
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an open, direct debate regarding these intuitions is the best means by which to
make such judgments. As Meiklejohn has observed, effective collective
decision-making requires that “unwise ideas . . . have a hearing as well as wise
ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as well as safe, un-American as well as
American.”65 Good collective decisions require open discussion of a broad
range of views—views that can only be aired amongst courts, in this context, if
First Amendment doctrine allows them (or forces them) to be discussed.
Furthermore, the broad discussion of foundational First Amendment values
promoted by doctrinal transparency reaches beyond the courts themselves. If
courts’ decision-making is premised on frank and open articulation as to why
society values speech and how that measures up against speech-based harm,
then this can trigger a further conversation not only within a court or amongst
other courts, but also amongst society at large.66 Take, for example, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder v. Phelps, where the Court deemed the
Westboro Baptist Church’s highly offensive protest at the funeral of a U.S.
Marine to be protected speech immune from liability for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.67 Both the majority opinion and Justice Alito’s dissent in
Snyder directly addressed, in a relatively transparent manner, the difficult
questions of speech value and harm posed in the case.68 And after it was
decided, the decision sparked significant public discussion, with some
bemoaning the court’s decision and others celebrating it as an important
reaffirmation of the immense value we impute to unfettered speech.69
65

See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 26.
See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 44, at 1002 (“[T]he decisions and opinions of the Court do not merely
decide cases, . . . they also announce values and shape the public’s understanding of the contents of our
common constitutional culture, a culture which forms the core of the sense of political community that
comprises the United States.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 69–70 (1996) (observing that statements from the Supreme Court
“communicate social commitments and may well have major social effects just by virtue of their status as
communication”). Seana Shiffrin has observed that on a broader level, open-ended approaches can induce
“moral deliberation” amongst the public, which “is important for our moral health and for an active, engaged
democratic citizenry.” Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of
Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1217 (2010).
67 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
68 See, e.g., id. at 1215–19 (explicitly basing its analysis of the case on the democratic self-governance
theory of speech protection and describing, in a step-by-step manner, how that theory leads to the result in the
present case); id. at 1222–29 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the “severe and lasting emotional injury”
suffered by the plaintiff and concluding that “[i]n order to have a society in which public issues can be openly
and vigorously debated, it is not necessary to allow the brutalization of innocent victims like [the plaintiff]”).
69 Compare Editorial, Even Hurtful Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
03/03/opinion/03thu2.html (opining that Snyder “provided an admirable reminder of how broad the protection
of free speech is under the Constitution’s First Amendment, including hurtful and hateful speech”), with Brian
66
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Thus, by pushing courts into a frank, open discussion regarding
foundational First Amendment values and assumptions, doctrinal transparency
not only assists courts in developing a sharper and more nuanced sense of these
values and assumptions; it also guides and promotes open discussion of them
amongst society at large.70 Doctrinal transparency thus helps to create a
positive feedback loop in which courts, by openly working through their
judgments regarding speech value and speech harm, drive the public
discussion, which may in turn shape the judgments made by courts down the
road in similar cases.71
Of course, one might reject the optimistic assumption that open debate will
necessarily lead to truth, better collective decision-making, or—at least—some
sort of social consensus.72 To the more critically inclined, these assumptions
might be little more than Pollyannaish naiveté; as critics of the truth-seeking
theory of speech have observed, speech markets may be subject to the same
sorts of market failures as economic markets,73 and the broad assumption of
reasoned evaluation that underlies the theory may not actually be accurate.74
So perhaps open discussion and dialogue in fact do little to get us closer to the
Broker, Letter to the Editor, Free Speech: Where to Draw the Line?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/opinion/l04scotus.html (“[I]t is the wrong place to put public speech
above the family’s right to privacy. Shame on our Supreme Court justices for doing so.”).
70 See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the
Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 931–43 (2003) (“Reasoning alone, no one individual can create political
judgment, or even acquire knowledge of the world. Through social interaction and discourse, individuals come
together to discover facts and generate norms.” (footnote omitted)).
71 See Bhagwat, supra note 44, at 1002 (“Ideally, the Court is merely one participant (albeit, an
especially authoritative one) in an ongoing debate or dialogue about constitutional values with the other
political branches and with other interested actors, including the public and the press.”); Sunstein, supra note
66, at 70 (“By communicating certain messages, law may affect social norms.”).
72 See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 31 (1986) (“Behind this approach is an implicit, perhaps optimistic, postulate of
something very like a human essence: that is, people’s capacity for reasonableness, suggesting the possibility
of reaching agreement through mutual dialogue and discourse.”).
73 See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (“Due
to developed legal doctrine and the inevitable effects of socialization processes, mass communication
technology, and unequal allocations of resources, ideas that support an entrenched power structure or ideology
are most likely to gain acceptance within our current market.”); Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech
Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1041 (describing the truth theory’s failure to account for “the
different access speakers have to means for influencing truth seeking discourse”).
74 See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 30 (observing that the pursuit of truth theory “presupposes a
process of rational thinking” and therefore “weakens or dissolves when the process does not obtain”); Steven
Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1281 (1983) (observing that the truth theory “calls up the picture of a
rational individual making informed choices, and downplays the extent to which the inputs in a culture
influence the beliefs of the persons within that culture”).
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truth, or to our best intuitions regarding the value and harms associated with
speech, or even to any sort of social consensus. Perhaps there are no “best
intuitions”—just eternally conflicting normative commitments competing for
legal enshrinement.75
Yet even if one were to fully reject the idea that open dialogue and
deliberation will somehow produce better doctrinal results or social consensus,
doctrinal transparency still produces the significant benefits that transparency
generally brings. Frank discussion of foundational judgments of speech value
and harm, including any empirical assumptions made, will at least set the stage
for open and honest social debate, both within and outside of the courts. Even
if no consensus is reached, this sort of discussion is a valuable one to have, as
it would continuously highlight the differing foundational judgments being
made by all sides as First Amendment doctrine develops. In other words, even
if the search for social consensus, or for unearthing our “best” intuitions to
guide doctrinal development, is ultimately futile, doctrinal transparency will at
least reveal to all parties involved the fundamental bases and assumptions
underlying any intractable disagreements regarding the scope of First
Amendment protection.
Furthermore, even if doctrinal transparency will not lead to consensus or
better judgments, it forces courts to bear responsibility for their decisions while
subjecting them to constant scrutiny. As Frank Michelman has observed,
transparent doctrine “affirm[s] rather than den[ies] . . . [a judge’s]
responsibility—in company with her colleagues—for the decision of the
parties’ case.”76 Such doctrine thus encourages a reflective, circumspect,
holistic, and reasoned approach to judicial decision-making.77 It encourages
judges to clearly articulate why they made the decisions they did, while
providing them with constant opportunities—amidst both external and internal

75 Cf. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 66 (1983) (“In our own complex nomos, however, it is the manifold, equally dignified communal
bases of legal meaning that constitute the array of commitments, realities, and visions extant at any given time.
The judge must resolve the competing claims of the redemptive constitutionalism of an excluded race, on one
hand, and of insularity, the protection of association, on the other.”).
76 Michelman, supra note 72, at 35.
77 See Mendelson, supra note 61, at 825–26; Michelman, supra note 72, at 34 (observing that an open
balancing test “invite[s] the expression and examination of doubts and disagreements, not just about
formulation of a standard for cases like this, but about this case and how its resolution will, given the context,
affect the meanings of the whole complex of governing standards”).
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scrutiny—to revisit their underlying judgments of speech value and harm,78
which in turn allows them to hone existing rules or formulate new rules to
govern novel situations. By contrast, adopting strict, opaque rules allows courts
to sidestep this sort of direct articulation of foundational speech values,
allowing them to decide cases in a rote, unreflective, and distant manner.79
Furthermore, adopting rigid and opaque rules increases the risk of doctrinal
calcification, even if changing technological or cultural conditions might call
for a reexamination of the foundational judgments of speech value and speech
harm underlying the present doctrine.
This basic articulation of the value of transparent doctrine has been most
notably reflected in the writings of legal pragmatist scholars who have
emphasized the value of open and transparent dialogue as a means of
constitutional adjudication. Michelman, for example, praised Justice
O’Connor’s use of an open-ended balancing test in Goldman v. Weinberger,80
observing that adopting this test “commits her . . . to the Court’s and the
country’s project of resolving normative disputes by conversation, a
communicative practice of open and intelligible reason-giving, as opposed to
self-justifying impulse and ipse dixit.”81 As Michelman writes, “The test’s
open categories invite the expression and examination of doubts and
disagreements, not just about formulation of a standard for cases like this, but
about this case and how its resolution will, given the context, affect the
meanings of the whole complex of governing standards.”82 Similarly, Daniel
Farber and Philip Frickey have advocated for the use of “practical reason” in
judicial decision-making, which involves “a concern for history and context; a
desire to avoid abstracting away the human component in judicial
decisionmaking; an appreciation of the complexity of life; some faith in
dialogue and deliberation; a tolerance for ambiguity, accommodation, and
tentativeness, but a skepticism of rigid dichotomies; and an overall humility.”83
78 See Mendelson, supra note 61, at 825–26 (observing that open balancing approaches “should make it
more difficult for judges to rest on their predispositions without ever subjecting them to the test of reason” and
“make their accounts more rationally auditable”).
79 Of course, from the standpoint of a rules advocate, this can be viewed as a positive rather than negative
trait, since rules that can easily be applied in a rote manner promote predictability and consistency in judicial
decision-making. See supra text accompanying notes 45–47.
80 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (evaluating the constitutionality of an Air Force regulation that prohibited the
petitioner from wearing a yarmulke indoors); see id. at 528–33 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
81 Michelman, supra note 72, at 34.
82 Id.
83 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1615, 1646 (1987).
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Other scholars, however, have challenged the idea that transparent,
open-ended approaches spur valuable dialogue regarding foundational values
and judgments. Alexander Aleinikoff, for example, has argued that although
transparent balancing approaches can potentially bring such benefits, they
“seem[] more often to have the opposite effect of distancing us from the
discourse,”84 since courts tend to apply balancing tests with a pseudoscientific
precision that obscures actual discussion of fundamental values and
principles.85 And Ashutosh Bhagwat has argued that although “[o]ne might
think that the use of explicit interest balancing would enhance constitutional
dialogue,”86 it tends to obscure matters insofar as it “does not distinguish
between instances where the Court is defining the scope of an underlying
constitutional norm, and instances where it is justifying noncompliance with
that norm because of exigent circumstances.”87
Although courts may sometimes—perhaps often—apply transparent
doctrinal approaches in a less-than-ideal manner, I disagree that balancing
approaches are somehow categorically less effective than rule-like approaches
in articulating fundamental constitutional values and promoting social debate.
Take, for example, Aleinikoff’s claim that “[s]cientifically styled” balancing
opinions render the weighing process “a mystery” and transform the public
into “spectators” that cannot engage in meaningful dialogue regarding
constitutional values and assumptions.88 Even when such analysis is presented
in a falsely objective and “scientific” manner, the fact that balancing analyses,
by definition, require the court to recite and analyze the interests on both sides
of the scale provides ample opportunity for broad public engagement with the
court’s analysis. And given the relative accessibility of basic balancing
approaches to laypeople—as compared to formal doctrinal analysis—there is
less reason to assume that the public will credulously accept the court’s answer
(or framing of the answer) as objectively or scientifically calculated.
In other words, even less-than-ideal analyses under a balancing framework
introduce some degree of valuable transparency, simply because the doctrine
84

T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 993 (1987).
Id. at 992–93.
86 Bhagwat, supra note 44, at 1003 n.185.
87 Id. at 1003. Bhagwat also argues that courts are not institutionally suited for these types of “ad hoc
policy judgments.” Id. at 1003 n.185. However true that may be in the abstract, courts’ decisions in First
Amendment cases are often driven by these sorts of judgments, despite rules that appear to suggest otherwise.
See infra Part II. In such instances, it seems clear that we would prefer them to decide cases in an open and
transparent manner rather than by sub rosa doctrinal manipulation. See infra Part III.
88 Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 993.
85
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requires courts to provide some meaningful justification for their decisions—
unlike, say, a completely opaque or practically non-constraining rule. Even
when courts apply balancing tests imperfectly, they must still center their
arguments around central First Amendment values and intuitions, and their
reasoning will still reveal—either explicitly or implicitly—any key empirical
assumptions they are making. This is far more meaningful transparency than
would usually be expected from a court applying—or purporting to apply—a
formal rule in a purely mechanical manner.
To be clear, this accounting of the value of doctrinal transparency is not
meant to be a categorical defense of transparent approaches. Nor is my intent
here to opine on the merits of any particular approach to constitutional
decision-making, or to delve into the longstanding theoretical debate as to
whether rules or standards are broadly preferable. There are plenty of reasons
to be wary of transparent approaches in First Amendment doctrine—most
notably, such approaches might hamper judges from “mak[ing] unpopular
decisions in times of stress.”89
But in the abstract, the value of doctrinal transparency—at least as I have
described it—can I think be generally acknowledged regardless of whether
one’s sympathies lie with legal pragmatism or traditional legal theory, and
regardless of whether one might be skeptical of any particular argument for its
value outlined above. Even if one is broadly critical of transparent approaches
based on philosophical or practical considerations, few will likely argue that
doctrinal transparency is never valuable in any circumstance,90 just as one
would be similarly hard-pressed to argue that doctrinal transparency is the only
relevant consideration in crafting effective doctrine.
D. Transparency as a Practical Component of Doctrinal Design
To say that doctrinal transparency is valuable is not to say that it ought to
be maximized at all costs; as discussed above, applying ad hoc balancing in
89 Bhagwat, supra note 44, at 1001; see also Blasi, supra note 7, at 474 (“In crafting standards to govern
specific areas of first amendment dispute, courts that adopt the pathological perspective should place a
premium on confining the range of discretion left to future decisionmakers who will be called upon to make
judgments when pathological pressures are most intense.”).
90 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 44, at 1000 (“It is not my position that balancing types of analysis, even
ad hoc balancing, always weaken constitutional rights.”); Blasi, supra note 7, at 485 (“The realistic goal must
be to contain such balancing, not eliminate it; even Justice Black recognized in disputes over the timing and
location of demonstrations an appropriate sphere for a case-by-case judicial comparison of communicative and
regulatory interests.”).
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every individual case would create a system that is far too unpredictable to be
practically manageable.91 As a matter of doctrinal design, the benefits of
doctrinal transparency must be weighed against its costs. Although we want
courts to articulate and grapple with their fundamental intuitions regarding
speech value and harm in deciding cases, we also value the predictability and
consistency associated with easy-to-apply rules, since they serve to limit
harmful chilling effects on protected speech. And the constraint on judicial
decision-making provided by rules is particularly important in the First
Amendment context, in which courts act as protectors of speech values against
majoritarian pressures; under a more transparent but less constraining doctrinal
framework, judges have more room to succumb to such pressures.92
Thus, transitioning from the realm of abstract theory to doctrinal design
opens up a set of more concrete, practical questions. Given both the value and
the costs of doctrinal transparency, when is transparent doctrine most usefully
deployed? And how can courts maximize the value of transparency in a
particular doctrinal context while minimizing its associated costs? In the
remainder of this Article, I will shift to these more practical questions
regarding the integration of transparency into existing First Amendment
doctrine by closely examining a number of recently decided Supreme Court
cases.
II. SOURCES AND COSTS OF DOCTRINAL OPACITY IN CURRENT FIRST
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
In this Part, I will explore two particular doctrinal contexts that the
Supreme Court has touched upon in recent cases: the establishment of a purely
historical test for identifying categories of low-value speech in Stevens and its
progeny, and the longstanding rule that content-based regulations of speech are
evaluated under strict scrutiny, which came into play in the Court’s decisions
in Williams-Yulee and Reed. As I observe, the Court has designed the doctrine
in these areas to be largely opaque, and I will outline the substantial costs
associated with such doctrinal design in these areas. In Part III, I will outline
why the Court’s doctrinal approaches in these areas have failed to capture the
91

See Stone, supra note 4, at 275–76 (calling ad hoc balancing “fatally unpredictable”); supra text
accompanying notes 36–38.
92 See Bhagwat, supra note 44, at 988 (observing that because “judges are often part of the majority
which the Constitution seeks to restrain[,] . . . there will be an inevitable tendency for judges to permit a
governmental action and to redefine a right, based on ad hoc balancing, in precisely those cases where
constitutional protection is most needed”).
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optimal balance between doctrinal transparency and opacity—that is, why the
substantial costs of the approaches adopted by the Court outstrip the limited
benefits associated with them—and I will propose some doctrinal adjustments
that would capture a more effective doctrinal balance.
A. Stevens and the Purely Historical Test for Low-Value Speech
1. The Development and Stated Rationales of the Test
In a set of cases starting with United States v. Stevens,93 the Supreme Court
has clarified—or radically reframed, depending on one’s perspective—the
means by which courts are to determine whether a certain category of speech is
deemed to be low-value, such that it is effectively entitled to no First
Amendment protection. At stake in Stevens was the constitutionality of a
federal statute that “criminalize[d] the commercial creation, sale, or possession
of certain depictions of animal cruelty.”94 The Stevens Court was thus directly
confronted with the question of whether depictions of animal cruelty
constituted protected speech for First Amendment purposes.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, began the analysis by
delineating the “historic and traditional categories” of speech that are “fully
outside the protection of the First Amendment,” “including obscenity,
defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct”—
categories “the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem.”95 The Court then noted the government’s
argument that “[w]hether a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment
protection depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech
against its societal cost.”96 As the Court observed, the government’s
formulation reflected the Court’s frequent and longstanding characterization of
existing low-value speech categories,97 dating back to its description of
low-value speech in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire as speech “of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”98

93
94
95
96
97
98

559 U.S. 460 (2010).
Id. at 464.
Id. at 468–69 (citations omitted).
Id. at 470.
Id.
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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The Court, however, rejected the government’s proposed balancing test,
characterizing it as “startling and dangerous.”99 Explicitly disclaiming any
“freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope
of the First Amendment,” the Court instead suggested that the test for
low-value speech is purely historical, based solely on whether the category of
speech in question “ha[s] been historically unprotected.”100 Noting the lack of
evidence that depictions of animal cruelty represented a historically
unprotected category of speech, the Court declined to carve out a new
low-value speech exception and held that the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad.101
The Court reaffirmed this purely historical approach to low-value speech in
later cases. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,102 the Court struck
down a California ban on selling or renting violent video games to minors. In
finding the speech in question protected, the Court stated that speech cannot be
deemed unprotected “without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on
content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of
proscription.”103 And in United States v. Alvarez,104 the Court struck down the
Stolen Valor Act, which criminalized lying about having received military
honors. In doing so, the four-Justice plurality observed that “content-based
restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when
confined to the few ‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] long
familiar to the bar.’”105
The Court’s recent adoption of this purely historical approach to low-value
speech was by no means mandated by Chaplinsky and its progeny—indeed, the
Court’s earlier decisions strongly suggest the categorical balancing approach
advocated by the government in Stevens.106 Why, then, did the Stevens Court—

99

Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
Id. at 472.
101 Id.
102 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
103 Id. at 2734.
104 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
105 Id. at 2544 (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468).
106 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (“[I]t is not rare that a content-based
classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines
of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if
any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”); see also Gregory P. Magarian, The
Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and the Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1339, 1347–48 (2015) (observing that most of the Court’s low-value speech decisions “have
100

HAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

1/14/2016 2:24 PM

TRANSPARENCY IN FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

383

in an 8–1 decision—so readily embrace a purely historical test? The opinion
makes clear that this decision was driven by the Court’s strong discomfort with
the idea that legislatures or courts could modify the scope of First Amendment
protection based on cost-benefit analysis. As the Court stated,
The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American
people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government
outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise
that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.
The Constitution is not a document “prescribing limits, and declaring
that those limits may be passed at pleasure.”107

The Court thus conceives of the First Amendment as having a determinate,
historically delineated scope. In evaluating whether a particular instance or
category of speech is protected, then, the Court’s sole responsibility is to
determine whether the speech falls within this historical scope of the First
Amendment, with the understanding that an answer to this question is (at least
theoretically) objectively ascertainable through historical analysis and inquiry.
As the Court sees it, although the traditionally recognized categories of
low-value speech reflect categorical judgments as to speech value and harm,
such judgments were effectively made and set in stone when the First
Amendment was ratified,108 and neither courts nor legislatures are free to
revise this initial understanding.109
2. The Test’s Inherent Lack of Objectivity and Constraint
What are we to make of this test? As an initial matter, the fundamental
premise of the Court’s approach—that the exclusion of traditional low-value
speech categories from First Amendment protection extends back to the
ratification of the First Amendment—might simply be inaccurate. In a recent
article, Genevieve Lakier persuasively argues that “eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century courts did not in fact consider low-value speech to be
said little or nothing about tradition, concentrating almost entirely on substantive justifications for excluding
certain speech from First Amendment protection”).
107 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
108 See id. at 468 (“‘From 1791 to the present,’ however, the First Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions
upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,’ and has never ‘include[d] a freedom to disregard these
traditional limitations.’”).
109 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (“But without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is
part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription, a legislature may not revise the ‘judgment
[of] the American people,’ embodied in the First Amendment, ‘that the benefits of its restrictions on the
Government outweigh the costs.’” (alteration in original) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
382–83 (1992))).
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categorically unworthy of constitutional protection”; indeed, “[i]t was only in
the New Deal period that courts began to link constitutional protection to a
judgment of the value of different kinds of speech.”110 Lakier thus observes
that the Court has essentially “invented [a] tradition” that “made it possible for
the government to punish speech . . . not only when it threatened serious
violence or disorder, but also when it violated dominant norms of civility,
decency, and piety.”111
Even assuming the underlying premises of the Court’s analysis, however,
the purely historical approach fails on its own terms, since the Court’s
fundamental assumption that such a test will prevent courts and legislatures
from using value judgments to “revise” the scope of the First Amendment is
untenable. The purely historical approach, in practice, offers little more than a
veneer of objectivity, predictability, and constraint that primarily works to
obscure the sorts of value judgments that the Stevens Court so emphatically
rejected.112 As I have previously written, this lack of constraint is ultimately
rooted in the broad flexibility by which courts can frame particular subsets of
speech and draw analogies.113 For present purposes, it is worth exploring in
greater detail why exactly this is the case.
Under the Stevens approach, a court confronted with the question of
whether a particular subset of speech is excluded from First Amendment
protection can take one of two approaches. The first approach is to analyze
whether the regulated speech in question falls within an existing historical
category of low-value speech. This inquiry focuses on the boundaries of the
existing low-value speech categories; in other words, are currently recognized
categories of low-value speech sufficiently broad to encompass the speech in
question?
This sort of boundary inquiry necessarily operates by analogical reasoning:
the court must discern whether the regulated speech is sufficiently similar to a
historically recognized category of low-value speech to warrant the same
treatment.114 But in order to undertake this analysis, the court must first
110

Lakier, supra note 10, at 2169.
Id. at 2168.
112 See David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of Self-Defining
Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 88 (2012) (“In the end, the relative value and harm associated with the speech
in question remains central to the analysis, since it is a court’s sense of these values that will influence how it
conducts the historical analysis.”).
113 Id. at 84–88.
114 Id. at 87.
111
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identify which characteristics of the historically excluded speech are
analytically significant.115 And, of course, one cannot identify analytically
significant characteristics without making an underlying value judgment as to
why the historically excluded category of speech has been excluded from First
Amendment protection. I cannot determine, for example, whether lying about
being awarded a military medal falls within the historically excluded category
of “fraud” unless I have a sense of what exactly makes fraudulent speech so
innately worthless or socially harmful; in other words, I cannot properly define
the boundaries of the low-value category of “fraud” without some value-laden
judgment as to why exactly fraud is unprotected.116 It is only after making such
value judgments regarding the significant characteristics of historically
excluded speech that courts can complete the analysis; to properly classify the
subset of speech in question, courts must determine whether that speech shares
these significant characteristics of the historically unprotected speech.117
Thus, courts cannot avoid value-based analysis under this application of
Stevens: they cannot analogize the speech in question to a historically
recognized category of low-value speech without assessing the speech’s
“social value” measured against “the social interest in order and morality.”118
And if that is the case, there is nothing stopping courts from using this
underlying value judgment to intentionally or unintentionally dictate the
manner in which they conduct historical analyses.119
Alvarez vividly illustrates this point. In Alvarez, both the plurality and the
dissent basically agreed on the relevant history: they both recognized a
longstanding tradition of proscribing things like defamation, perjury, and
fraud, all of which involve false statements of fact.120 From this same starting
point, however, the plurality and the dissent offered completely different views
on how they define the relevant category of historically excluded speech,
115

Id.
Many thanks to Ash Bhagwat for suggesting this formulation.
117 See Frederick Schauer, Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 346,
351 (2015) (“[W]hen we try to ask whether violent video games or animal crush videos would have been
regulable in the past we are engaged in the same dicey business of picking the features of these acts that do or
do not resemble past forms of regulation and nonregulation, and in doing so we are simply expressing our
current view about what we think should be regulated and what not.”).
118 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
119 See Lakier, supra note 10, at 2218 (stating that the Stevens Court’s analysis suggests “how
unpredictable, perhaps even incoherent, the historical test can be, given the difficulty of determining at what
level of generality it should be applied,” and observing that “[t]his leaves . . . a great deal of room for value
judgments to intrude into the analysis, albeit in cloaked form”).
120 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (plurality opinion); id. at 2561 (Alito, J., dissenting).
116
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which in turn dictated the way in which they analogized the subset of speech in
question.
The plurality defined the relevant historically excluded categories of speech
narrowly. That is, it rejected the notion that falsity alone is determinative of
speech’s protected status, choosing instead to characterize defamation, perjury,
and fraud as specific pockets of false statement of fact that share a particular
set of characteristics: they involve “legally cognizable harm associated with a
false statement” and “knowing or reckless falsehood[s].”121 In other words, to
the plurality, the falseness of speech, by itself, does not render it unprotected; it
is falseness in conjunction with other factors.122 The history therefore did not
indicate that false statements of fact in general are excluded from First
Amendment protection, but only that certain subsets of such speech are
excluded. This characterization drove the plurality’s conclusion that the speech
regulated by the Stolen Valor Act did not constitute the particular type of false
statement of fact historically recognized to fall outside of First Amendment
protection.123
By contrast, the dissent, working from the exact same historical
background, deemed the historical proscription of false statements of fact like
defamation, perjury, and fraud as reflecting a broad historical assumption that
all false statements of fact are generally unprotected by the First
Amendment124—a position reflected in numerous Supreme Court opinions
prior to Alvarez.125 Unlike the plurality, the dissent implicitly viewed the wellsettled subsets of unprotected false speech—like defamation, perjury, and
fraud—as merely the specific areas where the government chose to regulate.
That is, the mere fact that the government chose to regulate in these particular
areas did not mean that, as a historical matter, it could not have regulated false
statements of fact more broadly if it had wanted to do so. The dissent thus
deemed the speech regulated by the Stolen Valor Act to fall within the relevant
category of historically excluded speech.126

121 Id. at 2545 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2547 (stating that the statute suppresses all false
statements “entirely without regard to whether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain”).
122 Id. at 2545 (observing that in prior cases, “the falsity of the speech at issue was not irrelevant to our
analysis, but neither was it determinative”).
123 See id. at 2547.
124 See id. at 2560–61 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Time and again, this Court has recognized that as a general
matter false factual statements possess no intrinsic First Amendment value.”).
125 See id. (citing cases).
126 Id. at 2563.
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How could the plurality and dissent reach such diametrically opposing
results based on the same history? Each side’s interpretation of the history was
driven by a particular set of value judgments regarding the speech in question.
The plurality opinion assumed that at least some false statements have
sufficient value such that they are entitled to First Amendment protection in
their own right127—an assumption articulated more directly by Justice Breyer
in his concurrence.128 Thus, falsity by itself does not make speech valueless;
only particular subsets of false speech lack constitutional value. By contrast,
the dissenting opinion assumed—and stated explicitly—that factual falsity
alone is enough to render speech valueless and thus unprotected by the First
Amendment.129
Analyzing whether the speech in question falls within an existing category
of historically unprotected speech, however, is not the only way that courts can
apply the Stevens test. Although the Court presumably could have closed off
all expansion of the presently delineated categories of low-value speech,130 it
chose not to do so, explicitly recognizing the possibility that the current list of
historically excluded speech categories may not be complete.131 Thus, courts
applying Stevens can also analyze whether the speech in question represents a
novel category of low-value speech that should nevertheless be recognized
because it is supported by “a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of
proscription.”132
127

See id. at 2547 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he sweeping, quite unprecedented reach of the statute puts it in
conflict with the First Amendment. Here the lie was made in a public meeting, but the statute would apply with
equal force to personal, whispered conversations within a home. The statute seeks to control and suppress all
false statements on this one subject in almost limitless times and settings.”). The plurality opinion also evinced
concerns over the possibility of government abuse should all false statements of fact be deemed unprotected.
See id. at 2547–48 (observing that such a holding “would give government a broad censorial power
unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition”).
128 Id. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that “[f]alse factual statements can
serve useful human objectives,” like in situations where false statements “prevent embarrassment,” “protect
privacy,” or “stop a panic or otherwise preserve calm in the face of danger”).
129 Id. at 2560 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Time and again, this Court has recognized that as a general matter
false factual statements possess no intrinsic First Amendment value.”).
130 Indeed, if taken in its narrowest possible form, the Stevens test would “leave[] the law in a chaotic state
in which some categories are protected for no better reason than that the technology giving rise to them was
not in existence at an earlier point in our history.” Steven H. Shiffrin, The Dark Side of the First Amendment,
61 UCLA L. REV. 1480, 1491 (2014).
131 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“Maybe there are some categories of
speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as
such in our case law.”); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (indicating that a new
category of low-value speech may be recognized given “persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content
is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription”).
132 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
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Unlike the first approach, which focuses on the boundaries of existing
historically unprotected categories of speech, this approach focuses directly on
history—that is, does a “long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of
proscription” exist for this particular subset of speech? This approach,
however, suffers from a similar lack of meaningful constraint. Courts’
decisions as to how they frame both the speech in question and the relevant
history will often dictate the outcome, and these decisions are similarly driven
by underlying value judgments made by the court regarding the speech in
question.
Take, for example, the opinions in Brown, the case in which the Court
struck down California’s ban on selling or renting violent video games to
minors.133 The opinions in Brown set forth a wide range of different historical
narratives leading to different results. The majority opinion characterized the
California statute as targeting “speech about violence,”134 focusing its
historical narrative on the narrow question of whether a longstanding tradition
existed for “restricting children’s access to depictions of violence.”135 The
Court thus deemed its decision in Ginsberg v. New York136—in which it upheld
a similar statute regulating the sale of sexual materials to minors—to be
irrelevant to the present question.137 Observing that minors have long been
exposed to depictions of violence in works ranging from Grimm’s Fairy Tales
to the Odyssey, the Court found that no such tradition existed and struck down
California’s statute.138
Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion, by contrast, framed the historical
inquiry around the likely historical understanding of the “founding
generation,” marshalling evidence indicating that they “believed parents had
absolute authority over their minor children and expected parents to use that
authority to direct the proper development of their children.”139 Justice Thomas
thus deemed it “absurd to suggest that such a society understood ‘the freedom
of speech’ to include a right to speak to minors (or a corresponding right of
minors to access speech) without going through the minors’ parents.”140

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id. at 2741–42.
Id. at 2734.
Id. at 2736.
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735.
Id. at 2735–36.
Id. at 2752 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, suggested a third approach,
stating, “[T]he special First Amendment category I find relevant is not (as the
Court claims) the category of ‘depictions of violence,’ but rather the category
of ‘protection of children.’”141 In Justice Breyer’s narrative, the longstanding
general tradition of state regulation aimed at protecting children by controlling
their conduct—rather than a particularized tradition of speech laws aimed at
depictions of violence—ought to carry substantial weight in the analysis.142
Justice Alito’s opinion concurring in the judgment143 echoed Justice Breyer’s
and Justice Thomas’s approaches to a certain extent, observing that “the
California law reinforces parental decisionmaking in exactly the same way as
the New York statute upheld in Ginsberg.”144 Justice Alito then went on to
question the majority’s view that “violent video games really present no
serious problem,”145 observing that “the experience of playing video
games . . . may be very different from anything that we have seen before” and
recounting in detail the interactive nature and often gruesome content of
certain video games that he found troubling.146
This multiplicity of historical narratives vividly illustrates the openness of
pure historical analysis and the extent to which value judgments drive such
analyses. Both the relevant category of speech and the historical record can be
characterized in different ways to form divergent legal narratives that lead to
different outcomes.147 Is the relevant historical narrative a narrow one focused

141 Id. at 2762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also id. at 2771 (“[W]hat sense does it make
to forbid selling to a 13-year-old boy a magazine with an image of a nude woman, while protecting a sale to
that 13-year-old of an interactive video game in which he actively, but virtually, binds and gags the woman,
then tortures and kills her? What kind of First Amendment would permit the government to protect children by
restricting sales of that extremely violent video game only when the woman—bound, gagged, tortured, and
killed—is also topless?”).
142 Justice Breyer, however, did not argue that the speech in question constituted low-value speech on this
basis; he merely took this into account in applying “a strict standard of review” to the regulation, ultimately
deeming it to be constitutional. Id. at 2765–71. He identified both “the basic parental claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their children” and the “State’s independent interest in the well-being of
its youth” as compelling interests supporting the California law. Id. at 2767.
143 Justice Alito would have decided the case narrowly based on vagueness grounds and thus saw “no
need to reach the broader First Amendment issues addressed by the Court.” Id. at 2742–43 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment). He did, however, outline a number of “reasons for questioning the wisdom of the
Court’s approach.” Id. at 2746.
144 Id. at 2747.
145 Id. at 2742.
146 Id. at 2748–51 (describing the possibility of “games that allow troubled teens to experience in an
extraordinarily personal and vivid way what it would be like to carry out unspeakable acts of violence”).
147 See Han, supra note 112, at 86 (“Any analysis premised on a historical inquiry can operate in radically
different ways based on the level of generality taken.”).
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solely on a tradition of regulating children’s access to depictions of violence?
Or is it a broad one focused on a tradition of protecting parents’ ability to
control the speech to which their children have access, or a tradition of
generally protecting children from engaging in conduct that might be harmful
to them?
This narrative framing, in turn, rests on value judgments, since there must
be some basis for evaluating the relative significance of particular
characteristics of the speech in question or of different aspects of the historical
record.148 Some of these judgments might involve, to some extent, broader
structural or procedural commitments unrelated to the value of the speech or its
harmful effects.149 But they all reflect at least some baseline conception about
what makes speech valuable and how that value should be balanced against
different types and degrees of social harm.150 One cannot select the categorical
framing and historical narrative that best fits a particular instance or subset of
speech without some normative perspective on what, if anything, makes the
speech in question valuable and/or harmful. Indeed, in critiquing the majority’s
approach, Justice Alito’s opinion—which was notably joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, the author of Stevens—largely eschewed historical analysis in favor of
a value-oriented discussion regarding the potentially harmful nature of violent
video games.151 It implicitly recognized that it is these fundamental judgments
regarding speech value and harm—rather than an appeal solely to history,
which is broad and amorphous enough to encompass divergent legal
narratives—that drive the outcomes in these cases.
Thus, whether courts apply Stevens by analogizing to historically
recognized categories of low-value speech or by seeking “a long (if heretofore
unrecognized) tradition of proscription,” the underlying idea of a meaningfully
objective, purely historical analysis is illusory. Historical analysis under either
148 This dynamic is also reflected in the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, which is similarly
premised on history and tradition. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (“The selection of a level of generality necessarily
involves value choices.”); Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro
Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2802–04 (2005).
149 For example, Justice Thomas’s strong focus on the intent of the founding generation in Brown. See
supra text accompanying notes 139–40.
150 This conception may be reflected in courts’ judgments regarding the potential for government abuse
should regulation of certain speech be permitted. See supra note 127.
151 See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2750 (“If the technological characteristics of the sophisticated games
that are likely to be available in the near future are combined with the characteristics of the most violent games
already marketed, the result will be games that allow troubled teens to experience in an extraordinarily
personal and vivid way what it would be like to carry out unspeakable acts of violence.”).
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approach requires some baseline judgment of what makes speech valuable
and/or how that value ought to be compared to the social harms associated with
speech. Thus, the sorts of open-ended value judgments that the Stevens Court
condemned so vociferously are inevitable; no historical analysis can be
conducted without underlying value judgments, and these judgments can easily
influence the means by which courts conduct historical analysis. As I discuss
below, this is not to say that history and tradition cannot play any meaningful
role in the analysis; they might perhaps constrain judicial discretion to a certain
extent.152 But the Court’s apparent assumption that a purely historical approach
can consistently bring meaningful, value-neutral objectivity and constraint into
the analysis does not hold up to scrutiny.
3. The Costs of the Stevens Test’s Opacity
The categorical balancing approach advanced by the government in
Stevens—an approach that had long been inferred in the Court’s prior cases
involving low-value speech—is a quintessential example of transparent
doctrine.153 A court asked to undertake a “categorical balancing of the value of
speech against its social cost” has little room to hide. It must directly articulate
and grapple with the fundamental questions of what exactly makes speech
valuable and how that value ought to be measured against the social harms
caused by it. It must set forth its intuitions on the matter and explain them in
light of its understanding as to why speech is entitled to special protection. It
necessarily lays the court’s value judgments and empirical assumptions bare
and subjects them to scrutiny by other members of the court, reviewing courts,
and society at large.
By adopting a purely historical approach to low-value speech, however, the
Stevens Court swapped this broadly transparent approach for one that is largely
opaque. As I discussed in detail above, the idea of a value-neutral, purely
historical analysis is illusory; one simply cannot perform such analysis without
fundamental baseline judgments as to the value and social harms associated
with speech. The problem, however, is that an analysis characterized as purely
historical on its face exempts courts from articulating these underlying value
judgments. Because the test purports to be historical, courts are free to gloss
152

See infra text accompanying note 256.
Of course, ad hoc, case-by-case balancing would represent the most transparent doctrinal approach.
Because categorical balancing operates based on categories of speech rather than individual instances of
speech, it is a slightly more rule-like approach. Nevertheless, the categorical balancing approach to low-value
speech resides solidly on the transparent side of the spectrum, particularly in comparison to the Stevens test.
153
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their decisions with a façade of neutrality and constraint—a façade that allows
them to disclaim the very idea of making value-based judgments in First
Amendment cases as “startling and dangerous.”154 It obfuscates, rather than
illuminates, the fundamental value judgments that drive courts’ analyses.155
This is not to say that courts applying the Stevens test necessarily do so
intending to hide the ball. Courts might apply the test in good faith, motivated
solely by a focus on historical tradition; indeed, their particular application of
the historical analysis might rest, to some extent, on structural or philosophical
commitments unrelated to fundamental questions of speech value and harm.156
Yet this does not change the fact that value judgments are fundamentally
inseparable from historical analysis, whether courts are aware of this or not.
On the flipside, savvy courts can easily translate strongly held value judgments
regarding the speech in question into facially neutral historical analysis by
framing the speech in a particular manner, selecting one particular historical
narrative over others, and/or drawing analogies broadly or narrowly. In the
end, whether a court is acting in good or bad faith in a given case might well
be impossible to discern; there is simply too much play in the joints of the
Stevens test. Whether consciously or unconsciously, courts applying the
Stevens test can obscure the fundamental value judgments driving their
analyses behind a supposedly neutral, “purely historical” analysis.157

154

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
See Han, supra note 112, at 88 (“There is no purely ‘neutral’ means of historical analysis. . . . [T]he
relative value and harm associated with the speech in question remains central to the analysis, since it is a
court’s sense of these values that will influence how it conducts the historical analysis.”); Lakier, supra note
10, at 2225 (arguing that the Stevens rule “threatens to create a set of doctrinal distinctions that rest . . . on
hidden value judgments”).
156 See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2751 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“When interpreting a constitutional
provision, ‘the goal is to discern the most likely public understanding of [that] provision at the time it was
adopted.’” (alteration in original)).
157 See Lakier, supra note 10, at 2224–25 (“[T]he Stevens framework provides no vocabulary or set of
standards courts can use to evaluate whether the existing categories of low-value speech pose a threat to
democracy, or social progress, or any of the other purposes associated with the First Amendment.”). Compare,
for example, Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Alvarez with Justice Breyer’s concurrence. In analyzing
whether lies about receiving military honors constitute low-value speech, the plurality opinion merely went
through the motions of a purely historical analysis, with little discussion of the fundamental speech value
judgments underlying this analysis. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543–47 (2012) (plurality
opinion). By contrast, Justice Breyer, in deeming regulations of such speech subject to intermediate scrutiny,
forthrightly detailed his value assumptions regarding false statements of fact. See, e.g., id. at 2552–53 (Breyer,
J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that false statements of fact are “less likely than true factual
statements to make a valuable contribution to the marketplace of ideas” and thus can be subject to some
government regulation, but that they also “can serve useful human objectives”).
155
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The Stevens test thus allows courts to use the façade of objectivity provided
by a purely historical approach to distance themselves from their holdings.
Framing the analysis as purely historical bolsters the illusion that such an
approach is, to a meaningful extent, more objective, constraining, and neutral
than an approach that is forthrightly value-based. In doing so, courts can limit
the extent to which their decisions are meaningfully scrutinized; it would
obviously be more difficult for other courts or the public to challenge the value
judgments driving a particular decision if those judgments play no formal role
in the analysis and thus remain unarticulated. As Lakier has observed, value
judgments are inescapable in this area of First Amendment doctrine, and
“[a]ttempting to hide these judgments under the cloak of history does not make
them go away; it merely makes them harder to understand, engage with, and
critique.”158
The purely historical approach thus hamstrings courts from revisiting,
questioning, and developing their own underlying intuitions regarding speech
value and harm. When courts are forced to articulate these fundamental
intuitions openly, they are effectively subjecting themselves to internal
scrutiny; they must work through their value-based and empirical intuitions
and reconcile them with the case at hand. For example, the present facts might
spur deeper reflection as to what exactly makes speech valuable, or they might
require the court to make an empirical assumption as to the social harms that
will likely be caused by the speech. In working through these intuitions in light
of the case at hand, courts have the opportunity to reflect critically upon them
and clarify, revise, or reaffirm them as necessary—and these renewed or
revised intuitions can, in turn, affect the way in which they approach future
cases.159 A lack of doctrinal transparency limits courts’ capacity to develop a
sharper and more nuanced sense of the fundamental value judgments that
ultimately drive the low-value speech analysis.
Furthermore, because the opacity of the Stevens test obscures the
fundamental sources of disagreement—the underlying normative and empirical
intuitions regarding speech value and harm—behind a formal façade, it limits
the opportunities for meaningful discussion, debate, and possible reconciliation

158

Lakier, supra note 10, at 2232.
See Han, supra note 30, at 1700–13; Michelman, supra note 72, at 34 (observing that an open
balancing test “invite[s] the expression and examination of doubts and disagreements” both with respect to the
case in question and with respect to the doctrine as a whole).
159
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between courts and their external critics.160 As discussed above, frank and open
discussions regarding fundamental speech values serve to guide and promote
open discussion of such values amongst society at large—a public discussion
that might, in turn, eventually shape courts’ intuitions and judgments in later
cases.161 The opacity of the Stevens test, however, disrupts this virtuous cycle
of internal and external deliberation, dialogue, critique, and reformulation. And
on a purely practical level, it is valuable and useful to know whether the actual
root of a particular disagreement over low-value speech is normative or
empirical in nature. After all, new data or studies might bridge any empirical
disagreements, whereas normative disagreements would fall more squarely
into the realm of persuasion and dialogue. Even if no common ground is ever
reached, this sort of frank discussion is valuable in itself, since it at least
reveals the actual fault lines that separate the different sides of an issue—a
value that is lost when opaque approaches like the Stevens test are adopted.
The Stevens test thus leaves courts less prepared to deal effectively with
new types of speech or novel speech regulation contexts—a particularly vital
concern given the rapid rate of social and technological change surrounding
our communications culture. In recent years, for example, courts have
confronted First Amendment cases premised on search engine results,162
cyber-bullying,163 and pervasive image and video capture164—issues that were
largely unfathomable twenty-five years ago.165 In the face of such rapid and
pervasive change, a transparent doctrinal approach allows courts to constantly
reexamine—and, if necessary, recalibrate—their conceptions of speech value
and harm in a systemic manner. It would thus give space for First Amendment
doctrine to evolve in a coherent manner in response to these significant social
and technological changes, with continuous reexamination of the underlying
160 See Lakier, supra note 10, at 2218 (observing that the test “forces whatever value judgments may in
fact motivate these decisions to remain silent and hidden,” thus “undermin[ing] the transparency of judicial
decisionmaking that, by making courts’ reasoning vulnerable to popular critique, helps limit the
antimajoritarian power of the courts”).
161 See supra Section I.C.
162 See, e.g., Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D.
Okla. May 27, 2003).
163 See, e.g., People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014).
164 See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (2011) (describing the technological rise of
pervasive image capture and discussing a wide range of cases touching on such issues).
165 As Lakier observed in discussing the Court’s decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653
(2011), “Given how recently the technology to store personal information on a mass scale emerged, the
absence of a tradition of regulating speech of this kind tells us very little about whether courts and legislatures
would have believed it constitutionally permissible to do so.” Lakier, supra note 10, at 2220.
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foundational intuitions and judgments that ultimately drive the analysis. The
opacity of the Stevens test, however, does not afford courts this sort of
flexibility. Rather, by obscuring courts’ foundational judgments of speech
value and harm under a formal façade, it creates the conditions for doctrinal
stagnation and confusion. Understanding new speech contexts necessarily
requires testing them against these foundational judgments and determining the
extent to which those judgments ought to be reaffirmed or revised, and the
Stevens test hamstrings courts from undertaking this process.
Thus, the opacity of the Stevens test ultimately restricts the common law
process of doctrinal evolution that is vital in producing a well-tailored First
Amendment jurisprudence. If courts—and, by extension, the public—do not
have opportunities to articulate, revisit, and question our fundamental
intuitions and assumptions regarding speech value and harm, then those
intuitions and assumptions are unlikely to sharpen and evolve over time. And it
is particularly important for this sort of broad discussion to occur in doctrinal
contexts like defining low-value speech categories. Our foundational intuitions
as to why we value speech and how we balance this against the various social
harms associated with speech ultimately underlie nearly all of First
Amendment jurisprudence, and no other area of First Amendment doctrine
forces us to confront these intuitions in such a stark and direct manner.
Low-value speech analyses are thus particularly valuable opportunities for
courts—and society as a whole—to articulate, debate, and develop the
fundamental intuitions that drive First Amendment doctrine as a whole.
B. The Default Rule of Strict Scrutiny for Content-Based Restrictions on
Speech
The general rule that content-based restrictions on speech are evaluated
under strict scrutiny166 stands as one of the cornerstones of First Amendment
jurisprudence. The Court has crafted this rule as a default rule with exceptions:
as discussed above, the Court has identified certain categories of low-value
speech that are entitled to no First Amendment protection at all,167 and it has
also identified a few narrow categories of speech to which the First
Amendment offers only limited protection, such that government regulation of
such speech is evaluated under some form of intermediate scrutiny.168 But
166

See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
See supra text accompanying notes 93–98.
168 See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)
(truthful commercial speech).
167
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unless the regulated speech is explicitly identified as falling within one of these
designated categorical exceptions, the default rule is that strict scrutiny applies
to any content-based regulation.
This doctrinal structure, however, severely limits meaningful transparency
in two different ways. First, the default strict scrutiny standard of review is, at
least in operation, a relatively opaque one, particularly in comparison to the
more balancing-oriented intermediate scrutiny standard. Second, doctrinal
transparency is compromised significantly by the doctrinal distortion that has
resulted from the ill-fitting nature of the rule in a variety of cases—a distortion
that played a prominent role in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar and Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, two cases decided by the Supreme Court this past term. I will
address each of these issues in turn.
1. Transparency and Opacity in Strict Scrutiny Analysis
On its face, the strict scrutiny standard of review involves a form of
balancing analysis. Under strict scrutiny, a speech regulation is upheld only if
it is “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest,” and the
regulation must represent the least restrictive means of promoting that
interest.169 In essence, strict scrutiny, when applied in the First Amendment
context, assumes the highest value for the speech in question and requires a
showing that the government’s interest is sufficiently compelling—and its
means of promoting it optimally tailored—to outweigh the value of the
regulated speech. Thus, at least on its face, the strict scrutiny standard offers
some degree of doctrinal transparency, insofar as it invites courts to openly
discuss their intuitions and assumptions regarding the social harm caused by
the speech and weigh these against the presumed high value of the speech in
light of the Government’s chosen regulatory approach.
Strict scrutiny, however, is applied in a varied range of doctrinal contexts,
and the Supreme Court has applied the standard in different ways. As Richard
Fallon has observed, the Court sometimes applies strict scrutiny as a “nearly
categorical prohibition” that “will permit infringements of preferred rights only
to avert rare, catastrophic harms”170—an approach captured by Gerald
Gunther’s oft-quoted observation that strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in theory and

169
170

United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1303–04 (2007).
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fatal in fact.”171 Sometimes, however, it applies the standard as a “weighted
balancing” test in which “the stakes on the rights side of the scale are
unusually high and . . . the government’s interests must therefore be weighty to
overcome them.”172 And finally, strict scrutiny is sometimes applied as “a test
of illicit motives, appropriately applied to ensure that the government has not
purposely targeted a protected group or burdened a preferred right.”173 That
strict scrutiny, generally speaking, is not always applied in its “fatal in fact”
form is borne out by Adam Winkler’s empirical survey of federal court cases
applying strict scrutiny, which found that the challenged law survived in 30%
of such applications.174
In the specific context of speech, however, courts have broadly applied
strict scrutiny in its strictest, nearly categorical form.175 This approach is
reflected in the Supreme Court’s frequent use of absolutist-sounding rhetoric in
speech cases; in Mosley, for example, the Court declared that “the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”176
Furthermore, based on his empirical analysis, Winkler concluded that “strict
scrutiny is . . . most fatal in the area of free speech.”177 Indeed—at least
amongst cases that remain good law178—a majority of the Supreme Court has

171 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); see also Sullivan,
supra note 39, at 60 (“[T]he Court ties itself to the twin masts of strict scrutiny and rationality review in order
to resist (or appear to resist) the siren song of the sliding scale.”); Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry:
Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1298 n.222 (2006) (“Strict
scrutiny . . . almost always spells death for the speech limitation at issue.”).
172 Fallon, supra note 170, at 1306.
173 Id. at 1308. Such a motive-based approach can be either strict or deferential in nature. Id. at 1308 &
nn.233–34.
174 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795–96 (2006).
175 Fallon, supra note 170, at 1313 (“In free speech cases, the Supreme Court most commonly applies a
version of strict scrutiny that is ‘“strict” in theory and fatal in fact.’” (quoting Gunther, supra note 171, at 8)).
176 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (emphasis added); see also United States v.
Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of
its content will ever be permissible.”); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 649 (1984) (“Regulations which
permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the
First Amendment.”); Fallon, supra note 170, at 1304 (“The Court has frequently described the freedom of
speech in terms that make its claims sound almost categorically unyielding.”).
177 Winkler, supra note 174, at 844 (observing that the survival rate in free speech cases is “22 percent,
lower than in any other right”).
178 Although a majority of the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce upheld, under strict
scrutiny, a restriction on campaign-related expenditures from corporate or union treasury funds, 494 U.S. 652,
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clearly upheld a content-based speech regulation under strict scrutiny only
once, and that case involved prominent national security considerations.179
Broadly speaking, the purpose of this “fatal in fact” brand of strict
scrutiny—its reason for being—is to largely preclude the kind of discretionary
balancing suggested on the face of the test. Adopting this form of strict
scrutiny represents a decision to adopt a rule-like approach, rather than a
standard-like balancing approach, to the regulation in question—that is, a
decision to restrict judicial discretion such that the regulation is, in effect,
automatically invalidated.180 It reflects a judgment that the formal arbitrariness
flowing from a rigid, categorical rule is less of a concern than the arbitrariness
and unpredictability resulting from the open exercise of judicial discretion in
each individual case.181
In the First Amendment context, the preference for this nearly categorical
application of strict scrutiny in cases involving content-based speech
restrictions is driven by multiple considerations, such as concerns over
potential chilling effects, fear of judicial bias, and the risk that judges will
overvalue concrete and immediate state regulatory interests as compared to
more generalized and abstract speech-related interests.182 As Geoffrey Stone
has observed, “[I]n analyzing content-based restrictions, the Court has
appropriately embraced a ‘fortress model’ of jurisprudence that gives judges
little room to maneuver and that intentionally overprotects speech, in order to
minimize the potential harm from legislative and administrative abuse and
660–61 (1990), Austin was later overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 558 U.S. 310,
365 (2010).
179 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (upholding application of statute
prohibiting the provision of material support to foreign terrorist organizations). Last Term, in Williams-Yulee
v. Florida Bar, five Justices appeared to agree that the content-based speech restriction in question survived
strict scrutiny, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015), but only four Justices agreed that strict scrutiny was the
applicable standard. Id. at 1664–65 (plurality opinion); id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). A plurality of the Court upheld a content-based speech regulation under strict
scrutiny in Burson v. Freeman. 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding election-day
restrictions on speech close to polling places).
180 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 7, at 72 (characterizing the Court’s application of strict scrutiny to contentbased speech restrictions as a “rejection of balancing”); Sullivan, supra note 39, at 60 (“[I]n true categorical
fashion, two-tier review generally decides cases through characterization at the outset, without the need for
messy explicit balancing. The classification at the threshold cuts off further serious debate: ‘this is an x case
and therefore the government (or rightholder) wins.’ This is a rule-like regime.”).
181 See Kennedy, supra note 40, at 1689.
182 See Han, supra note 30, at 1656 (“[C]ourts may tend to undervalue the usually far-reaching and
systemic benefits of speech compared to the typically more immediate social harms produced by that speech,
which might call for ex ante doctrinal adjustments.”); Stone, supra note 7, at 72–76 (describing these and other
reasons for the Court’s rule-like approach to content-based speech restrictions).
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judicial miscalculation.”183 Thus, since strict scrutiny is used “to ensure that
the inequities of the moment are subordinated to commitments made for the
long run,” it means little if it “can be watered down whenever [it] seem[s] too
strong.”184 The adoption of full-blooded strict scrutiny in content-based speech
regulation cases reflects a broad judgment that the dangers associated with
open-ended judicial discretion outweigh the inequities associated with an
ill-fitting, overprotective, but easy-to-apply rule.
Because its application is essentially outcome-determinative, the nearly
categorical form of strict scrutiny that courts have applied in these cases is a
largely opaque standard. As Kathleen Sullivan has observed, although the strict
scrutiny formulation technically “require[s] a court to go through the motions
of balancing a right against a . . . compelling interest, . . . this is not real
balancing,” since “the challenged law is never supposed to survive.”185 In other
words, although the strict scrutiny standard appears transparent on its face, it is
generally opaque in practice, as courts generally do not need to meaningfully
articulate and wrestle with their foundational intuitions regarding the value of
the right at stake and the relevant regulatory interests in order to reach the
preordained outcome.186
The opacity of this form of strict scrutiny is highlighted most clearly when
compared to intermediate scrutiny.187 Unlike strict scrutiny or rational basis
review, intermediate scrutiny does not preordain victory for one side or the
183

Stone, supra note 7, at 73–74.
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 785 (1996) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO.
L. REV. 293, 296 (1992).
186 This is not to say that applications of full-blooded strict scrutiny are always opaque; a court could still
undertake the analysis in a transparent and reasoned manner. The outcome-determinative nature of the
standard, however, greatly limits the likelihood that courts will undertake any sort of deep and nuanced
analysis. By contrast, if strict scrutiny is applied as a weighted balancing test, it starts to resemble the sort of
transparent reasonableness or proportionality inquiry more associated with intermediate scrutiny. Fallon, supra
note 170, at 1302. This approach to strict scrutiny, however, would still be less transparent than the more open
balancing approach associated with intermediate scrutiny to the extent that any thumb on the scale in support
of the right gives courts potential leeway to avoid meaningful inquiry into foundational value judgments and
assumptions. See Winkler, supra note 174, at 804 (observing that “[t]he weighted balancing approach to strict
scrutiny reflects a compromise between” Justice Black’s view that the First Amendment should be read
categorically and Justice Frankfurter’s preference for open balancing).
187 Although the exact doctrinal formulation of the intermediate scrutiny standard varies in different
contexts, one example is the Central Hudson test that applies to content-based restrictions on truthful
commercial speech, which requires that the government interest be substantial and that the regulation “directly
advance[] the government interest asserted” in a way that is “not more extensive than necessary to serve the
interest.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
184
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other, nor does it place a thumb on the scale in either direction.188 Rather, “it
establishes a level playing field upon which conflicting state and private
interests do battle.”189 As Sullivan noted, “In either its official or de facto form,
intermediate scrutiny is a balancing mode”; although all tiers of review
“employ[] the vocabulary of weights and measures as a metaphor for
justification,” intermediate scrutiny is the only standard of review that “really
means it.”190 Thus, intermediate scrutiny—unlike strict scrutiny—is designed
to be meaningfully transparent. Unlike the nearly categorical nature of true
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny actually forces courts to openly confront
and grapple with foundational questions and assumptions regarding the value
of the rights at stake and the government’s regulatory interests, as it leaves
courts with little doctrine to hide behind.
2. Reed, Williams-Yulee, and the Distorting Force of Strict Scrutiny
If strict scrutiny, when applied to content-based speech regulations,
translates to near-automatic invalidation, how does this influence the ways in
which courts decide speech cases? As I noted above, this rule applies as a
default to all speech that has not been specifically carved out and identified as
low-value speech or speech otherwise entitled to special treatment. In other
words, the baseline presumption is that speech is fully protected, such that
content-based restrictions of it are subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, the default
rule of strict scrutiny technically applies to a vast expanse of speech; as long as
speech is deemed to be involved, and as long as the speech does not fall into
one of the narrow delineated exceptions to the rule, any content-based
regulation of the speech is subject to strict scrutiny and presumed invalidation.
The problem with this broad rule of strict scrutiny, however, lies in the
reach of its coverage to all speech not explicitly carved out as some form of
low-value speech. Even when the recognized categories of low-value speech
are excluded, there remains a strong intuition that not all remaining speech
ought to be valued equally, and that applying the strict scrutiny default rule is
too severe in particular cases. In other words, in some subset of cases, the
default rule of strict scrutiny does not fit, in that its application does not match

188 See Sullivan, supra note 185, at 298 (“Where intermediate scrutiny governs, the outcome is no longer
foreordained at the threshold. Instead of winning always or never, the government may sometimes win or
sometimes lose—it all depends.”).
189 Note, supra note 148, at 2808.
190 Sullivan, supra note 185, at 300–01.
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our fundamental intuitions regarding the value of speech and the social harms
associated with the speech.
The regulated speech in Alvarez—false factual statements about having
received military medals—exemplifies this disconnect. Even if one agrees—as
both the plurality and Justice Breyer’s concurrence did—that false statements
of fact of this sort are not low-value speech like obscenity, it also seems
obvious that such false statements of fact are not as valuable as, say, truthful
political speech. If that’s the case, one might argue that the same stringent
standard of review applied to regulations of the highest-value speech ought not
to apply to false statements of fact.
Alvarez thus represents a case dealing with what one might call
“middle-value speech”—that is, speech that, for one reason or another, sits
somewhere in the hazy middle of the speech-value spectrum between clearly
high-value speech (like truthful political speech) and clearly low-value speech
(like true threats).191 Evaluating content-based regulations of middle-value
speech under the same onerous strict scrutiny standard that applies to, say,
regulations of truthful political speech creates tension with our foundational
intuitions about speech value and harm. This is because strict scrutiny is harsh
medicine—as discussed above, its mere application in this context generally
mandates a finding of unconstitutionality.
How, then, do courts deal with such tension in middle-value speech cases?
The plurality opinion and Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Alvarez illustrate
two different approaches that courts could take. The plurality simply applied
the default rule, applying strict scrutiny to the Stolen Valor Act and striking it
down on that basis.192 Justice Breyer, on the other hand, explicitly carved out
false statements of fact as a distinct category of partially protected speech like
commercial speech, the regulation of which would be subject to intermediate
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny.193

191 I discuss the conceptual category of middle-value speech in great detail in a forthcoming article. See
David S. Han, Middle-Value Speech (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The sorts of speech that
might qualify as “middle-value” are of course debatable, and my purpose here is not to designate any
particular subsets of speech as such. But possible examples include sexually explicit (but not obscene) speech,
panhandling, or detailed instructions regarding dangerous or illegal activities. See infra note 281 and
accompanying text.
192 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548–51 (plurality opinion).
193 Id. at 2551–52 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).

HAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

402

1/14/2016 2:24 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:359

These approaches represent two different ways for courts to trade off the
value of opaque but determinate rules against the value of transparent and
flexible standards in response to such tension. Justice Kennedy’s approach
implicitly recognizes that effective bright-line rules will by nature involve a
lack of perfect fit that will sometimes lead to anomalous results, and it
effectively trades off these occasionally anomalous results in return for the
gains in predictability and consistency associated with a strict, inflexible
rule.194 Justice Breyer, however, takes the opposite approach: by carving out a
formal exception, he incrementally trades off the benefits associated with rigid
bright-line rules in favor of more standard-like flexibility. In other words,
while his approach theoretically allows for courts to reach more correct results,
it also diminishes the predictability and consistency associated with a nearly
categorical strict scrutiny default rule.
There is, however, a third approach that courts have taken to resolve this
tension between the onerous strict scrutiny default rule and the widely variable
value of the speech covered by the rule: doctrinal distortion. That is, rather
than simply apply strict scrutiny in the usual manner or carve out an explicit
exception to the rule, courts might surreptitiously distort the doctrine to reach
the “correct” result in cases where the onerous strict scrutiny standard does not
seem to fit.195
The Court’s recent decisions in Williams-Yulee and Reed illustrate the high
potential for doctrinal distortion introduced by the default rule of strict
scrutiny. In Williams-Yulee, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality
of a Florida Bar rule prohibiting candidates in judicial elections from
personally soliciting campaign funds.196 Observing that the rule constituted a
content-based restriction on speech, Chief Justice Roberts—writing only for a
194

It is of course impossible to read Justice Kennedy’s mind, so it’s unclear whether he actually felt any
tension in applying strict scrutiny to a category of speech like false statements of fact. It is worth noting,
however, that he never explicitly used the term “strict scrutiny,” see, e.g., id. at 2543 (plurality opinion)
(calling the standard “exacting scrutiny”), perhaps indicating some hesitation in applying strict scrutiny in the
case.
195 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 44, at 968 (“[T]he phrase ‘hard cases make bad law’ is a plea to judges
and other rulemakers not to deviate from, or to alter, clear and well-established rules because of the equities of
a particular case. ‘Bad law’ in this context is understood as the distortion or even the disregard of clear rules
for the sake of a ‘just’ result.”). A similar distorting dynamic is often cited in describing the effects of the
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
799 (1994) (“The exclusionary rule renders the Fourth Amendment contemptible in the eyes of judges and
citizens. Judges do not like excluding bloody knives, so they distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth Amendment
was not really violated.”).
196 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662–64 (2015).
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plurality of the Court on this point—deemed strict scrutiny to be the
appropriate standard, despite arguments from the Florida Bar that a more
permissive standard be used.197 Despite observing that it is a “rare case” in
which a content-based speech restriction is deemed “narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling [government] interest,” the Court found that the Florida Bar rule
met that high standard.198
The Court stated that the rule advanced the “vital state interest in
safeguarding public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s
elected judges.”199 It then deemed the underinclusiveness of the law
unproblematic for purposes of narrow tailoring, since the law “aimed squarely
at the conduct most likely to undermine public confidence in the integrity of
the judiciary: personal requests for money by judges and judicial
candidates.”200 It also stated that the law was not overinclusive, since it
restricted only a “narrow slice of speech.”201 Although the Court recognized
that certain personal appeals for money—for example, an in-person
one-on-one solicitation—created a greater appearance of impropriety than
others—for example, an impersonal, mass-mailed solicitation—it held that the
law was sufficiently tailored to survive strict scrutiny.202
In a scathing dissent,203 Justice Scalia observed that while the Court
purported to apply strict scrutiny, “it would be more accurate to say that it . . .
appl[ied] the appearance of strict scrutiny.”204 He contrasted the Court’s ready
acceptance, “on the basis of its intuition” and without the “slightest evidence,”
that banning personal requests for contributions will substantially improve
public trust in judges, with the strict empirical standards adopted in Alvarez,
where the plurality applied strict scrutiny to strike down a law prohibiting lies
197 Id. at 1664–65 (plurality opinion). Only four Justices joined the part of the Court’s opinion identifying
strict scrutiny as the relevant standard, while the remainder of the opinion garnered majority support.
198 Id. at 1666.
199 Id. (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)).
200 Id. at 1668. The law still permitted, for example, direct solicitations made by the candidate’s campaign
committee, thank-you notes from the candidate to campaign donors, and direct solicitations from the candidate
for personal gifts or loans. Id. at 1663, 1669–70.
201 Id. at 1670.
202 Id. at 1671 (“The First Amendment requires that Canon 7C(1) be ‘narrowly tailored,’ not that it be
‘perfectly tailored.’” (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 (1992))).
203 Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined by Justice Thomas, and his views were largely shared by Justices
Kennedy and Alito. See id. at 1682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia gives a
full and complete explanation of the reasons why the Court’s opinion contradicts settled First Amendment
principles.”); id. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I largely agree with what I view as the essential elements of
the dissents filed by Justices Scalia and Kennedy.”).
204 Id. at 1677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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about receiving military honors because the government failed to meet its
“heavy [evidentiary] burden” of proving that “the public’s general perception
of military awards is diluted by false claims.”205 Justice Scalia also emphasized
the rule’s clear lack of tailoring, observing that, on the one hand, the rule
“prohibits candidates from asking for money from anybody,” including “an old
friend, a cousin, or even [a] parent,” while on the other hand, it allows a
candidate to ask a lawyer “for a personal loan, access to his law firm’s luxury
suite at the local football stadium, or even a donation to help her fight the
Florida Bar’s charges.”206
The dissenting Justices’ argument that the Court applied a watered-down
version of strict scrutiny to uphold the Florida Bar rule is highly persuasive. As
Justice Alito colorfully noted, the rule was “about as narrowly tailored as a
burlap bag,” given that it drew no distinctions based on analytically significant
factors such as the identity of the people solicited and the method of
solicitation.207 Even if strict scrutiny does not necessarily require “perfect
tailoring,” the Court in applying strict scrutiny has consistently required
tailoring far more precise than that represented by the Florida Bar’s extremely
blunt rule.208 The Court, in essence, adopted a standard more akin to an
intermediate-scrutiny style balancing test than the near-categorical rule it
usually applies in speech cases. In this way, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
closely parallels the plurality opinion in Burson v. Freeman—an opinion upon
which he relied heavily—in which a plurality of the Court similarly applied a
watered-down version of strict scrutiny in a content-based speech restriction
case.209
205

Id. at 1678.
Id. at 1679–80.
207 Id. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting).
208 For example, in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874–79 (1997), the Court applied strict scrutiny in
evaluating a provision of the Communications Decency Act that “prohibit[ed] the knowing sending or
displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age.” Id.
at 859. The Court struck down the statute because it found that less restrictive but equally effective alternatives
existed, such as “requiring that indecent material be ‘tagged’ in a way that facilitates parental control of
material coming into their homes,” id. at 879; even though, as Eugene Volokh observed, it was clear that
“[n]one of the Court’s proposed alternatives . . . would have been as effective as the CDA’s more or less total
ban.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT.
REV. 141, 149–56. Similarly, in Playboy Entertainment Group, the Court held that a rule requiring cable
companies to block adult channels at households upon request constituted a less restrictive alternative to a rule
requiring the companies to scramble, block, or limit the transmission hours of such channels, despite the
government’s reasonable argument that a block-on-request rule would not be an equally effective alternative.
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806, 816–27 (2000).
209 In Burson, the Court evaluated a state statute that prohibited campaign speech within 100 feet of
polling places on election days. 504 U.S. 191, 193–94 (1992) (plurality opinion). In finding that the statute
206

HAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

TRANSPARENCY IN FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

1/14/2016 2:24 PM

405

What was actually happening in Williams-Yulee? One possible explanation
is that Chief Justice Roberts effectively viewed the regulated speech in
Williams-Yulee as “middle-value” speech—speech to which applying strict
scrutiny in its usual, near-categorical form does not seem to fit—perhaps
because of the nature of the speech itself (personal solicitation from a judicial
candidate), the substantial social harm associated with the speech (decreased
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary), or some combination of the two.
Or, perhaps, he applied strict scrutiny as a highly deferential illicit motive
test.210 Either way, rather than explicitly adopt a less onerous standard of
review—as Justice Ginsburg advocated in a concurring opinion211—he simply
watered down the typical strict scrutiny standard to reach the desired result.212
Doctrinal distortion of a different sort can be seen in the Ninth Circuit
panel’s opinion in Reed.213 At stake in Reed was the constitutionality of an
ordinance regulating the display of outdoor signs. The ordinance specifically
distinguished between “ideological signs,” “political signs,” and “temporary
directional signs,” according the most favorable treatment to ideological signs,
less favorable treatment to political signs, and the least favorable treatment to
temporary directional signs.214 The ordinance defined ideological signs as
signs “communicating a message or ideas for noncommercial purposes” that
do not fall into a limited list of exceptions; political signs as signs “designed to
influence the outcome of an election called by a public body”; and temporary

survived strict scrutiny, the plurality adopted a similarly diluted version of the standard, requiring only that the
regulation constitute a “reasonable” response to “potential deficiencies in the electoral process” and that it not
“significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights.” Id. at 209 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers
Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1986)). And like the Williams-Yulee Court, the Burson plurality deferred broadly
to the government’s judgment regarding the need for the regulation, despite the scant evidence produced to
support it. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, the dissent in Burson similarly called out the plurality for
applying a “toothless” analysis that was “neither exacting nor scrutiny.” Id. at 226 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
210 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1670 (“We will not punish Florida for leaving open more, rather than
fewer, avenues of expression, especially when there is no indication that the selective restriction of speech
reflects a pretextual motive.”). Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued that the rule’s scope “suggests that it has
nothing to do with the appearances created by judges’ asking for money, and everything to do with hostility
toward judicial campaigning.” Id. at 1681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
212 The same might be said of Burson as well. To the plurality, the near-categorical form of strict scrutiny
likely did not fit based on some judgment regarding the limited value of the speech (campaign speech directly
outside a polling place on election day) and/or the substantial harms associated with the speech (erosion of
electoral integrity).
213 707 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
214 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224–25 (2015).
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directional signs as those “intended to direct pedestrians, motorists, and other
passersby to a ‘qualifying event.’”215
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld the ordinance. The majority
held that “the distinctions between Temporary Directional Signs, Ideological
Signs, and Political Signs are content-neutral” because each category “is based
on objective criteria and none draws distinctions based on the particular
content of the sign.”216 It also observed that as far as the ordinance is
concerned, “[i]t makes no difference which candidate is supported, who
sponsors the event, or what ideological perspective is asserted.”217 As a result,
the majority upheld the ordinance under the intermediate scrutiny standard
applicable to content-neutral speech restrictions.218 In dissent, Judge Watford
argued that the First Amendment “prohibit[s] the government from favoring
certain categories of non-commercial speech over others based solely on the
content of the message being conveyed,” and he observed that this prohibition
extends to subject-matter-based distinctions just as much as viewpoint-based
distinctions.219
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Ninth Circuit decision, agreed with
Judge Watford’s analysis. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas stated that
“[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless
of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of
‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”220 He then
confirmed that the strict scrutiny default rule against content discrimination
applies equally to subject-matter-based restrictions as it does to
viewpoint-based restrictions, and he observed that the ordinance clearly made
such distinctions.221 Applying strict scrutiny, he easily found that the ordinance
was not “narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.”222

215

Id.
Reed, 707 F.3d at 1069.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1077.
219 Id. at 1078 (Watford, J., dissenting).
220 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)).
221 Id. at 2231.
222 Id. at 2232. Justice Thomas’s opinion therefore parallels Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in
Alvarez: to the extent Justice Thomas felt any tension between the onerous strict scrutiny standard and the
generally benign sign regulation, he opted to simply bite the bullet and apply strict scrutiny. See id. at 2231
(observing that although “[t]his type of ordinance may seem like a perfectly rational way to regulate signs,”
the default strict scrutiny rule dictates that even seemingly reasonable laws “will sometimes be struck down”).
His decision also may have been made easier by the fact that—as Justice Kagan noted in her concurrence—the
216
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As Justice Kagan observed in her opinion concurring in the judgment,
however, there is substantial dissonance in applying the severe strict scrutiny
standard to, say, sign ordinances that distinguish safety signs, historical site
markers, or signs that identify the address of a home from other signs.223 As
she noted, this dissonance is likely driven by the very low likelihood that
forbidden governmental motives are involved in these sorts of sign ordinances
and the limited extent to which such ordinances are likely to distort the
marketplace of ideas.224 It might also be driven by a broad sense that speech in
the form of outdoor signage can be regulated more stringently given
municipalities’ clearly legitimate safety and aesthetic concerns in limiting the
clutter of such signs. As Bhagwat observes, if space for outdoor signage is a
scarce resource—due to either physical constraints or safety concerns—then
the sorts of subject-matter-based distinctions made in the Reed ordinance seem
to be an eminently reasonable means of allocating this scarce space.225 After
all, the ordinance effectively valued political and ideological speech more than
purely informational speech, which reflected the Court’s own longstanding
understanding that political speech is generally more valuable than commercial
speech226 and speech on matters of public concern is generally more valuable
than speech on matters of private concern.227
The Ninth Circuit sidestepped this ill-fitting application of strict scrutiny by
stretching the boundaries of the content-neutrality inquiry. Instead of watering
down the strict scrutiny standard like the Court in Williams-Yulee, the Ninth
Circuit shoehorned the facially content-based sign regulation into the category
of content-neutral regulations—a holding that contradicted a well-established

ordinance in Reed “[did] not pass strict scrutiny, or intermediate scrutiny, or even the laugh test.” Id. at 2239
(Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment).
223 Id. at 2236 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment).
224 See id. at 2237. But see id. at 2229 (“Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship
presented by a facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield such statutes to
suppress disfavored speech.”).
225 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Who’s Afraid of Content Regulation? 20–21 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Signs of (Dis)content?, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 137, 146–47 (2015).
226 Compare, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is ‘at the
core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.’” (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365
(2003))), with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“[W]e . . . have afforded
commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of
First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression.”).
227 Bhagwat, Who’s Afraid of Content Regulation?, supra note 225, at 21; see, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps,
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214–15 (2011).

HAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

408

1/14/2016 2:24 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:359

line of Supreme Court case law.228 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit ensured that it
could evaluate the ordinance under the intermediate scrutiny applicable to
content-neutral regulations229—a standard of review that represented a better
fit given the circumstances of the case in question.
To be fair to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court has sent some mixed
signals as to whether facially content-based speech regulations automatically
trigger strict scrutiny without any consideration of improper legislative intent
or motive.230 But as Leslie Kendrick has observed, a close parsing of the
Supreme Court’s cases indicates that apart from two early exceptions,231 “the
Court has never taken up its own invitation to ignore the facial proxy in favor
of justification,” at least “when it comes to facial classifications by subject
matter or viewpoint.”232 In any event, to the extent the Supreme Court has been

228 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993) (rejecting the idea
that “discriminatory . . . treatment is suspect under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to
suppress certain ideas” (ellipsis in original)); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115–17 (1991) (same); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972)
(deeming ordinance content-based because “the ordinance itself describes impermissible picketing not in terms
of time, place, and manner, but in terms of subject matter”). As the Reed majority observed, “an innocuous
justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content neutral.” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at
2228.
229 Content-neutral speech regulations are permitted “provided that they are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
230 See Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality,
16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261, 1268–70 (2014) (arguing that the Supreme Court has “cycled among competing
definitions of ‘content neutrality’”—a “strong” version that categorically deems all facially content-based
regulations to be subject to strict scrutiny and a “weak” version that “focuses solely on government motivation
and/or justification”); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (stating that “[t]he
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys,” although the ordinance in that case was deemed
content-neutral); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–21 (2000) (adopting the approach set forth in Ward);
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732–36 (1990) (plurality opinion) (deeming an anti-solicitation law
content-neutral given the Postal Service’s lack of intent to “suppress the views of any disfavored or unpopular
political advocacy group”).
231 The exceptions Kendrick identifies are the Court’s allowance of subject-matter-based restrictions on
“low-value” speech in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746–50 (1978), and its adoption of the
secondary effects doctrine in a series of cases dealing with adult-oriented businesses, which I discuss in greater
detail below, see infra text accompanying notes 233–44. Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited,
98 VA. L. REV. 231, 256–62 (2012).
232 Kendrick, supra note 231, at 259. Kendrick argues that seemingly inconsistent cases like Hill and
Kokinda did not involve viewpoint-based or subject-matter-based distinctions, but rather other types of facial
distinctions to which the Court has not consistently applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 262–74 (discussing
communication-related discrimination, message-based discrimination, and persuasion-related discrimination).
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less-than-clear in outlining the parameters of content-neutrality analysis, this
doctrinal confusion has been driven, to a significant extent, by the exact same
attempt to avoid applying full-blooded strict scrutiny in cases where
application of such an onerous standard seems dissonant.
The clearest example of this point is the Supreme Court’s use of the
“secondary effects” doctrine in cases dealing with zoning restrictions on adult
businesses. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, the city of Renton enacted
zoning restrictions that prohibited any “adult motion picture theater” from
being located in close proximity to residential housing, parks, churches, or
schools.233 As the dissent noted, the ordinance was content-based on its face, as
it singled out adult motion picture theaters for special regulation.234
Nevertheless, the Court deemed it to be content-neutral, since the regulation
“aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult motion picture theatres,’
but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding
community,” with goals such as preventing crime, preserving property values,
and protecting retail trade.235 As a result, the Court evaluated the ordinance
under intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny and upheld it.236
Since Renton, the secondary effects doctrine has been subject to withering
criticism from all corners. As Mark Rienzi and Stuart Buck have noted, Renton
“warped” content-neutrality analysis by introducing the idea that a facially
content-based regulation can nevertheless be deemed content-neutral, thus
giving courts the room to claim that “the ‘principal inquiry’ for content
analysis is whether the government operated with an impermissible motive.”237
Geoffrey Stone called Renton “a disturbing, incoherent, and unsettling
precedent” that “threatens to undermine the very foundation of the

She does state, however, that “[t]he order I am attempting to show in the Court’s [content-neutrality]
jurisprudence is, without doubt, latent rather than patent.” Id. at 241.
233 475 U.S. 41, 44 (1986) (stating that the ordinance prohibited such theaters “from locating within 1,000
feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any
school”).
234 Id. at 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that “[m]ovie theaters specializing in ‘adult motion
pictures’” are subject to the restrictions, while “[o]ther motion picture theaters, and other forms of ‘adult
entertainment,’ . . . are not subject to the same restrictions”).
235 Id. at 47–48.
236 Id. at 49–54.
237 Mark Rienzi & Stuart Buck, Neutral No More: Secondary Effects Analysis and the Quiet Demise of the
Content-Neutrality Test, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1187, 1200 (2013); see also Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit
Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 91 (1988) (“[Renton]
turns the Court’s traditional focus on the language of statutes on its head and seems to permit benign
legislative intent to reduce the level of scrutiny regularly directed at laws that discriminate on their face.”).
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content-based/content-neutral distinction,” since—contrary to well-established
case law—it allowed the government to escape strict scrutiny of content-based
speech restrictions by simply defending the restrictions with justifications
unrelated to communicative impact.238 Indeed, nearly all speech that the
government seeks to regulate carries harmful negative secondary
consequences; it’s often because of these consequences that the government
seeks to regulate the speech in the first place.239 A number of Justices have
explicitly recognized the sleight-of-hand nature of the doctrine;240 Justice
Kennedy, for example, called the content-neutral characterization of these sorts
of zoning ordinances “something of a fiction,” observing that such ordinances
“are content based, and we should call them so.”241
Why did the Court adopt such an unprincipled doctrinal approach in these
cases? The most likely answer is that the Court surreptitiously distorted
existing doctrine in order to avoid the anomalous consequences of applying the
onerous strict scrutiny default rule. That is, the Court distorted doctrine simply
because according the same degree of First Amendment protection to, say,
adult movies as truthful political speech ran up against its fundamental
intuitions as to speech value and harm. As Alan Brownstein has observed, the
Renton Court not only ignored the facially content-based nature of the
ordinance, but also remarkably dismissed out of hand the possibility of an
impermissible subordinate motive to the ordinance;242 thus, as Brownstein
concludes, “[a]lthough the Court never explicitly affirms the view that sexually
explicit expression is a generally less valuable form of speech . . . , no other
explanation of Renton is plausible.”243 Indeed, this explanation is borne out by
the fact that the Court has never formally extended the secondary effects
doctrine beyond the context of adult-oriented businesses.244
238 Stone, supra note 7, at 116–17; see also id. (observing that the doctrine risks “erod[ing] the coherence
and predictability of first amendment doctrine”).
239 See John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 307 (2009)
(“Almost all speech with harmful direct effects also has negative downstream consequences that are
predictable. Indeed, it is typically because of the downstream social consequences that government officials
often wish to regulate dangerous speech.”).
240 See Kreimer, supra note 230, at 1297 (observing that “[a]n array of Justices acknowledge that the
‘secondary effects’ doctrine . . . is a bit of a cheat” and citing cases).
241 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment).
242 Brownstein, supra note 237, at 92–93.
243 Id. at 95.
244 See Fee, supra note 239, at 304–05 (“The Court has never upheld a content-discriminatory regulation
on the basis of the secondary effects doctrine that did not concern sexually explicit speech.”); Kendrick, supra
note 231, at 257 (“[M]any of the Court’s subject-matter and viewpoint cases have involved the potential
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These are not isolated examples of doctrinal distortion caused by the
default rule of strict scrutiny. Bhagwat has catalogued similar distortions in
other areas, such as cases dealing with buskers and panhandlers, abortion
protesters, and disclosures of personal data.245 Furthermore, courts can
manipulate doctrine246 in other ways besides watering down strict scrutiny or
stretching the content-based/content-neutral distinction; for example, they
might find a way to characterize the communication in question as non-speech
conduct that falls completely outside of First Amendment coverage,247 or they
might leave the specific standard of review applied in the case intentionally
vague.248
This sort of doctrinal distortion represents a major cost of the traditional
default rule of strict scrutiny. The most obvious cost is the destabilizing ripple
effect such distortions have on the entirety of First Amendment doctrine,
including areas where the law has been well-settled. Watering down the strict
scrutiny standard in the context of cases like Williams-Yulee impairs its
efficacy as a predictable near-categorical standard elsewhere;249 distorting the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral speech restrictions in
cases like Renton risks unsettling that distinction elsewhere.250 This cost is
extension of Pacifica or the secondary-effects rationale to other forms of expression, and in every such case
the Court has rejected the argument.”).
245 See Bhagwat, supra note 225, at 7–10, 12–14 (discussing these possible distortions and citing cases).
246 To be clear, there is often a fine line between what can be characterized as unprincipled doctrinal
manipulation and what can be characterized as an expected lack of legal clarity or consistency associated with
hard cases or a legitimate extension of doctrine. Although such characterizations might be debatable in many
cases—and might sometimes involve a degree of subjectivity—some decisions and analyses are certainly more
readily identifiable as doctrinal distortions than others. See supra text accompanying notes 233–44 (discussing
the secondary effects cases).
247 Cf. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 18–19
(2012) (describing the variable treatment of “speech disclosing detailed instructions for criminal or dangerous
activity,” which some courts treat as a “species of conduct” and others treat as protected speech).
248 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723–24 (2010) (stating that a
standard of review more demanding than intermediate scrutiny applied, but otherwise leaving the standard
vague). Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts—who wrote the majority opinion in Holder—recently clarified
that the Holder Court was in fact applying strict scrutiny. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656,
1666 (2015); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014).
249 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If this rule can be characterized as
narrowly tailored, then narrow tailoring has no meaning, and strict scrutiny, which is essential to the protection
of free speech, is seriously impaired.”); cf. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2235 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I
recognize that the Court could escape the problem by watering down the force of the presumption against
constitutionality that ‘strict scrutiny’ normally carries with it. But, in my view, doing so will weaken the First
Amendment’s protection in instances where ‘strict scrutiny’ should apply in full force.”).
250 See, e.g., Rienzi & Buck, supra note 237, at 1200 (arguing that the secondary effects cases “have
subtly distorted the content-neutrality analysis even applied to regulations of political speech by turning it into
a direct inquiry focused almost exclusively on legislative motive”).
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potentially expansive, one that extends beyond the necessary and expected
costs associated with the occasional anomalous results inherent to any rule-like
approach.
For present purposes, however, I want to focus on another substantial cost
associated with such doctrinal distortion: the cost in transparency. The
doctrinal distortion represented in these cases serves to obscure the underlying
value judgments actually driving the results, as it allows courts to clothe their
decisions in formal “doctrinal” terms without offering any space for them to
articulate or grapple with the foundational value judgments that are actually
driving their analyses. The Supreme Court in Renton and the Ninth Circuit
panel in Reed, for example, framed their analyses as if their findings of content
neutrality were simply the inevitable products of formal doctrine.251 Yet they
were in fact likely driven, at least in part, by foundational judgments regarding
the value of sexually explicit speech and the relative value and harm associated
with outdoor signage—judgments that were never explicitly set forth in those
cases. Similarly, the Williams-Yulee plurality’s application of a diluted form of
strict scrutiny was likely driven by a similar set of foundational value
judgments regarding campaign fund solicitations from judicial candidates—
judgments that were expressed far more directly and transparently in Justice
Ginsburg’s concurring opinion arguing for a less onerous standard of
review.252
One could perhaps characterize the sorts of doctrinal distortions described
above as actually increasing doctrinal transparency insofar as they funnel cases
away from strict scrutiny analysis—which, as discussed above, is largely
opaque in nature253—and into more balancing-oriented approaches, whether in
the form of a watered-down version of strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny.
Although this might be true to a certain extent, such approaches nevertheless
obscure doctrine on a broad level. Watering down the strict scrutiny standard
or treating content-based regulations as content-neutral allows courts to avoid
open discussion regarding the inherent value of the speech in question, since
neither intermediate scrutiny nor strict scrutiny, on their face, considers the

251 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46–54 (1986); Reed, 707 F.3d 1057, 1067–76
(9th Cir. 2013).
252 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673–75 (setting forth the reasons why states should have
“substantial latitude . . . to enact campaign-finance rules geared to judicial elections”).
253 See supra Section II.B.1.
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value of the speech as part of the relevant calculus.254 Thus, a court need not
explain why, for example, it deems sexually explicit speech to be less valuable
than truthful political speech, even if that is the actual underlying basis for its
differential treatment of such speech.
Furthermore, doctrinal distortion breeds confusion, and confusion limits the
extent to which courts can accurately articulate and grapple with foundational
questions of First Amendment value and harm. If a court distorts doctrine to
characterize a clearly content-based speech restriction as content-neutral, for
example, then its analysis will be obscured insofar as it rests on this flawed
premise. That is, if the court inaccurately assumes that the law is
content-neutral, then it will necessarily ask the wrong analytical question: is
the “content-neutral” law in question sufficiently tailored to serve an important
government interest? The actual question underlying the court’s decision—the
one that accurately encapsulates the central issue of the case—is in fact a very
different one: although the law in question is content-based, why do our
fundamental judgments regarding speech value and harm dictate that the
normal presumption of strict scrutiny should not apply?
Doctrinal distortion thus allows courts to decide cases by asking the wrong
questions. And even if those wrong questions might invite more open-ended
balancing inquiries, they nevertheless work to obscure the doctrine because
they direct the inquiry away from the fundamental judgments actually
underlying the court’s analysis. Such distortion thus hamstrings courts’ ability
to participate in a meaningful dialogue regarding fundamental speech values—
both amongst each other and amongst society at large. It sidetracks what ought
to be an open and transparent debate over fundamental speech values into
squabbles over formal doctrine. Furthermore, the indeterminacy and fluidity it
introduces into the doctrine increases the risk that courts will simply talk past
each other rather than engage in meaningful debate. A court’s application of a
watered-down version of strict scrutiny or its subtle distortion of the content
neutrality doctrine might simply be missed by other courts, thus drastically
limiting the potential for direct and forthright debate regarding the underlying
reasons for such distortions.

254 See supra notes 169, 187 and accompanying text (setting forth the doctrinal tests for intermediate and
strict scrutiny). Technically speaking, the inherent value of the speech comes into play only in the initial
determination of whether the speech falls into a designated category of unprotected (or lesser-protected)
low-value speech. See supra text accompanying notes 166–68.
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3. The Costs of Opacity Associated with the Traditional Rule
The traditional rule applying strict scrutiny as a default to content-based
restrictions on speech thus limits doctrinal transparency in two distinct ways.
First, strict scrutiny itself is a largely opaque standard, particularly when
applied in the “fatal in fact” form broadly adopted in speech cases. Because it
creates such a strong presumption of unconstitutionality, strict scrutiny makes
it easier for courts to decide cases without meaningfully working through their
fundamental judgments of speech value and harm. Second, under the
traditional rule, strict scrutiny applies to a broad range of speech of varying
value, which produces cases where applying such an onerous standard is
dissonant with courts’ normative and empirical intuitions regarding the speech
in question. Courts have responded to this tension by distorting doctrine in
order to avoid the consequences of the strict scrutiny standard, which works to
obscure the fundamental judgments regarding speech value and harm that
actually drive their analyses.
This doctrinal opacity carries significant costs, which I have outlined in
detail above.255 It limits the internal and external scrutiny imposed on courts’
decision-making. It hamstrings judges from effectively revisiting, testing, and
questioning their foundational intuitions regarding speech value and harm
when confronted with novel speech contexts. It limits the extent to which
fundamental disagreements about speech values can be meaningfully and
openly discussed, both amongst courts and amongst society at large, thus
obscuring the differing normative and empirical assumptions that underlie
these disagreements. In all of this, it limits the ability of First Amendment
doctrine to evolve in a coherent manner amidst a rapidly changing
technological, social, and cultural landscape.
III. RECALIBRATING THE DOCTRINE TO EFFICIENTLY REALIZE THE BENEFITS
OF DOCTRINAL TRANSPARENCY
Although I have given a detailed account of the significant transparency
costs associated with the current doctrinal frameworks governing low-value
speech and content-based speech restrictions, such costs do not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that these doctrinal frameworks are suboptimal. As
described above, the trade-offs between doctrinal transparency and opacity
roughly track the trade-offs between standards and rules: an increase of
255

See supra Section II.A.3.
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doctrinal transparency—and all of the benefits associated with it—must be
balanced against its costs in the form of a loss of predictability and
consistency. The optimal solution is not necessarily for courts to maximize the
degree of transparency or for them to adhere only to perfectly predictable and
consistent rules—it is to craft the right balance of open-ended transparency and
constraining opacity to yield the most benefits from each approach at the
lowest cost.
Of course, this is not an inquiry that can be made with scientific exactitude,
and one can expect substantial disagreement regarding the extent to which an
optimal balance has been reached in various doctrinal areas. That being said, I
think it is fairly clear that the Court’s purely historical approach to identifying
low-value speech does not strike a sound balance between opacity and
transparency, for the simple reason that this test trades off the substantial
benefits associated with doctrinal transparency for minimal gains in
predictability and consistency. And although the traditional strict scrutiny
default rule governing content-based speech restrictions presents a harder
question, the fact that courts have regularly distorted doctrine to avoid the
consequences of the rule strongly indicates that the doctrinal framework ought
to be recalibrated. I delve into these arguments in greater detail below, and I
make some suggestions as to how courts might adjust the doctrine to balance
these considerations more effectively.
A. The Stevens Test and the Problem of Non-Constraining Rules
As discussed above, doctrinal transparency represents a vital means for
courts—and, by extension, society in general—to articulate and work out our
foundational intuitions as to why we value speech and how that value
compares to the different harms associated with speech. This sort of open
dialogue establishes the conditions under which clearer and more coherent
doctrine can emerge. And even if this sort of clarity or coherence is impossible,
transparent doctrine is valuable insofar as it forces judges to lay bare the
fundamental assumptions—whether normative or empirical—underlying their
respective views. On the other hand, however, since doctrinal transparency
generally corresponds to open, standard-like approaches, it also produces costs,
as increased judicial discretion limits doctrinal predictability and consistency.
Thus, it will sometimes—perhaps often—make sense to sacrifice the benefits
of transparency for the predictability and constraint offered by more opaque
but easier-to-apply abstract rules.
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Given this balance of costs and benefits, it directly follows that if a
prevailing abstract rule is not in fact effective in providing meaningful
constraint and predictability to judicial decision-making, the rule is inferior to
a more transparent approach. There is simply no reason to adopt opaque
doctrine if it provides no meaningful benefits to offset the associated loss of
transparency. That is, there is no reason to trade off the benefits of doctrinal
transparency if little to no value in the form of increased predictability and
consistency is realized in return.
The purely historical approach to low-value speech outlined in Stevens
clearly illustrates this point. As discussed above, the purely historical test does
not provide the meaningful constraint or objectivity to the analysis that
presumably drove the Court to adopt it. It is, in reality, as open-ended and
indeterminate as the categorical balancing test rejected by the Court—but
without the benefit of doctrinal transparency. In other words, the purely
historical test does little more than obscure the underlying value judgments that
are actually driving courts’ analyses, without offering any sort of systemic
benefits in return.
This is not to say that history and tradition, in the abstract, cannot play any
meaningful constraining role in delineating the boundaries of low-value speech
categories or recognizing additional categories of low-value speech. Concern
for the historical pedigree of a potential category of low-value speech generally
represents a systemic concern for doctrinal stability—a recognition that
constant doctrinal expansion of low-value speech categories might prove to be
harmful for various reasons, such as slippery-slope concerns, possible chilling
effects, and so forth. It encapsulates an additional value, external to questions
of speech value and harm, that might well be relevant to the equation: the
systemic value of caution and deliberate doctrinal development, one that
emphasizes conservative, careful, and incremental adjustments to doctrine
rather than rapid evolution. So a general appeal to history and tradition might
be used simply as a means of counseling for caution.256
Thus, the fact that the Stevens test looked to history and tradition is not the
problem. The problem is its characterization of the inquiry as a purely
historical, value-neutral one. It is this aspect of the test that makes it bad
doctrine: it carries a veneer of constraint, objectivity, and value-neutrality, but
it does not actually offer much more predictability or consistency than the
256 History and tradition may be useful for this purpose even if, as Lakier argues, the actual history as
described by the Stevens Court is inaccurate. See supra text accompanying notes 110–11.
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transparent balancing test that the Stevens Court rejected. It sacrifices a frank
and open discussion of speech value and harm, and all of the benefits
associated with that, for little gain in predictability and consistency; in doing
so, it limits the extent to which the basic value judgments that actually drive
the analysis can be fully scrutinized, developed, and adjusted.257
Furthermore, as I noted above, doctrinal transparency is particularly
valuable in the specific context of defining low-value speech categories. This
particular question presents the foundational balancing inquiry underlying the
First Amendment in its purest and most direct context, since courts must
ultimately determine whether the speech in question is so lacking in value, or
so associated with significant social harm, that it effectively falls outside of the
scope of First Amendment protection. Thus, cases dealing with low-value
speech issues are uniquely valuable opportunities for courts—and, by
extension, society as a whole—to articulate, debate, and develop these
fundamental intuitions as to why we value speech and how that value should
measure up against the social harms associated with speech. Such cases
operationalize the fundamental intuitions underlying First Amendment doctrine
in their starkest form.
It is also difficult to think of an abstract, rule-like approach to the low-value
speech inquiry that would both adequately track our foundational intuitions
regarding speech value and harm while imposing meaningful predictability and
constraint on judicial decision-making. Currently recognized categories of
low-value speech include defamation, fraud, true threats, incitement, fighting
words, child pornography, obscenity, and speech integral to criminal
conduct;258 there is no simple and obvious characteristic that ties all of these
categories together, other than the broad determination that the speech in such
cases is particularly valueless or the harm associated with the speech is
particularly severe. It seems highly unlikely that the analysis is amenable to
any sort of highly abstracted, rule-like approach—indeed, the stark balancing
judgment at the center of the inquiry suggests that any such formal rule risks
being distorted or ignored by courts to match the outcome that would be
dictated by this judgment.

257 See Lakier, supra note 10, at 2227 (observing that under a “purpose-based test,” a court’s exercise of
discretion is “evident, and the court’s reasoning and conclusions are subject to critique,” while under the
Stevens test, “the discretion built into the test is hidden, and is therefore much more difficult to understand and
respond to”).
258 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion).
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What, then, might constitute a better and more transparent approach to lowvalue speech? For starters, we would be better off simply embracing the
traditional categorical balancing approach in this area—an approach that forces
courts to directly articulate and confront fundamental questions of speech
value and harm.259 Furthermore, such foundational inquiries need not be the
sole basis for the analysis; any additional considerations, such as a desire for a
strong norm of caution and narrow construction of low-value speech
categories, can be openly integrated as well. In other words, historical pedigree
can still operate as a relevant consideration, but it should operate in a more
transparent and accurate manner: as reflecting a cautionary norm that might
serve as a thumb on the scale in conducting the overarching categorical
balancing inquiry. Such an approach would bring all of the unstated value
judgments underlying the Stevens test out into the open in a manageable way,
thus allowing for a candid discussion about how we ought to value particular
categories of speech as measured against their social harms and how, on a
systemic level, the development of First Amendment doctrine should best
proceed.
B. Recalibrating the Strict Scrutiny Default Rule for Content-Based Speech
Restrictions
1. Doctrinal Distortion as a Symptom of Poor Systemic Design
Unlike the Stevens test governing low-value speech—which trades off the
benefits of transparency for little gain in predictability or consistency—it is
more difficult to judge, in the abstract, whether the traditional default rule
applying strict scrutiny to content-based speech restrictions strikes an optimal
balance between the benefits of doctrinal transparency and its costs. To the
extent that mechanical application of the rule might produce anomalous results
and allow courts to avoid transparent discussions regarding fundamental
speech values, these are simply the costs that must be paid in order to reap the
gains in predictability and consistency associated with the rule. Perhaps a
predictable but rigid rule is better here under a judgment that we are more
259 See Han, supra note 112, at 88–89; see also Lakier, supra note 10, at 2225 (“First Amendment
doctrine would be better off were the Court to more affirmatively embrace the purposive and functional, rather
than historical, nature of the distinction between high- and low-value speech.”). As I noted above, a categorical
balancing approach would not be the most transparent possible approach to such cases, since it would involve
balancing on the level of categories rather than on a case-by-case basis. See supra note 153. Such an approach,
however, represents a more practical compromise between the benefits associated with transparency and the
practical realities of judicial decision-making.
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concerned with the arbitrariness associated with judicial discretion than the
formal arbitrariness associated with an over- or under-inclusive rule.260 And
perhaps the rule’s tendency to overprotect speech reflects our normative
preference—based on considerations such as chilling effects on protected
speech—for errors to be decided in favor of speech.261
But the fact that courts have, in a wide range of contexts, resorted to
doctrinal distortion in order to avoid the anomalous consequences associated
with a straightforward application of the strict scrutiny default rule strongly
suggests that the current doctrinal framework has not captured the optimal
balance between opaque, rule-like approaches on the one hand and transparent,
standard-like approaches on the other.262 Whether an area of doctrine is built
primarily around rules or standards, doctrinal distortion is a telltale symptom
of poor doctrinal design. To illustrate why this is the case, it is useful to
conceptualize First Amendment doctrine as a hydraulic system.263 To the
extent that the doctrine produces results that accord with our fundamental
intuitions regarding the value of speech and the social harms associated with
speech, the system runs smoothly. But whenever the doctrine produces a result
that contradicts this underlying foundational judgment, it creates pressure
within the doctrinal system—pressure that must be contained or released in
some manner.264

260

See Kennedy, supra note 40, at 1689.
See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,”
58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 688 (1978) (“[T]he chilling effect doctrine recognizes the fact that the legal system is
imperfect and mandates the formulation of legal rules that reflect our preference for errors made in favor of
free speech.”); Stone, supra note 7, at 74 (“By applying strict scrutiny to virtually all content-based restrictions
of high-value speech, rather than attempting to calibrate its standards according to assessments of the relative
speech and governmental interests in each case, the Court has erected a strong barrier against institutional
underprotection.”).
262 Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 44, at 984–85 (“[T]he existence of many hard cases might suggest the need to
reconsider a constitutional rule as well as common law rules. There are clearly instances in which the Court
has, and should, reconsider its constitutional doctrine in light of ongoing discomfort with the doctrine’s
consequences.”).
263 This metaphor has been invoked in a wide variety of contexts. See, e.g., N. Sec. Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197, 400–01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (observing that “[g]reat cases . . . make bad law”
because they “exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful,
and before which even well settled principles of law will bend”); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 880 (2008) (“There is a hydraulic quality to federalism doctrine: weakening one set
of constraints on national power tends to create pressure to tighten others if the overall objective of meaningful
balance is to be maintained.”).
264 Cf. Han, supra note 30, at 1716 (“[L]egal doctrine is often hydraulic in nature; whenever the rigidness
in one doctrinal area exerts pressure on courts’ decisionmaking, that pressure often seeks release in other areas
of the doctrine.”).
261
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Because, for obvious practical reasons, First Amendment doctrine cannot
be built solely on ad-hoc balancing judgments, some degree of pressure will be
inevitable. In a healthy doctrinal system, it is dealt with in two different ways.
First, a good doctrinal system, like a good hydraulic system, is built to absorb
some degree of pressure. This comes in the form of courts simply adhering to
the established rule and living with the anomalous results produced—which,
after all, is the necessary cost of building a more stable and predictable
doctrinal framework.265 Second, if this doctrinal pressure builds up to a
dangerous extent, a good doctrinal system has release valves to release the
pressure in the form of formal exceptions. For example, the Court’s decision to
create categorical low-value speech exceptions serves to release the significant
doctrinal pressure that would build if courts were required to apply the default
strict scrutiny rule in such cases.266
Doctrinal distortion occurs when the pressure created by the conflict
between our intuitional judgments of what is fair or sensible or correct and the
outcomes produced by the doctrine overwhelms the system. It happens when
the magnitude of the pressure in one area is so immense—that is, when the fit
of the rules is so poor—that the system cannot absorb it, causing ruptures and
disturbances throughout. It happens when no release valves—that is,
opportunities to craft formal exceptions—are built into the system to relieve
this pressure, or when these release valves are insufficiently robust to save it.
As discussed above, the damage caused by this doctrinal distortion can be
immense, destabilizing the entire doctrinal framework in areas well beyond the
source of the initial doctrinal pressure; diluting the strict scrutiny analysis in
one particular area, for example, risks diluting it everywhere, even in places
where its near-categorical nature had been firmly established.267 This potential
for substantial, far-reaching collateral harm extends beyond the typical
trade-offs made between transparent balancing approaches and opaque

265

See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1194–95 (1988) (“Were existing first amendment rules to be applied to commercial speech,
we can foresee . . . dangers of doctrinal dilution, where ‘doctrinal dilution’ refers to the possibility that some
existing first amendment rule would lose some of its strength because of the number of unacceptable
applications it would generate when its new applications were added.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 195 n.24 (1983) (“The low value
theory . . . is an essential concomitant of an effective system of free expression, for unless we are prepared to
apply the same standards to private blackmail, for example, that we apply to public political debate, some
distinctions in terms of constitutional value are inevitable.”).
267 See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text.
266
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rule-like approaches. Doctrinal distortion produces an undercurrent of
uncertainty and arbitrariness beneath the doctrine’s formal façade, and it
obscures, on a broad level, the fundamental value judgments driving the
courts’ analyses.
Furthermore, it creates these substantial systemic costs in return for little
systemic benefit.268 At least within the specific areas where doctrinal distortion
exists, all of the arguments in favor of rule-like approaches break down.269 If
the doctrine has been distorted, then facially administrable rules do not yield
any actual benefits; they do not actually constrain, nor do they offer
meaningful predictability.
Thus, the fact that courts have resorted to doctrinal distortion in order to
avoid the default rule of strict scrutiny is a strong indicator that the doctrine is
not calibrated correctly. It indicates that the pressure created by the rule’s lack
of fit in certain cases is so great that courts have chosen to circumvent the rule
by distorting the doctrinal framework rather than simply apply it and live with
these anomalies. Furthermore, courts have not effectively released this pressure
by carving out formal exceptions, and this might be for any number of reasons:
perhaps lower courts are institutionally averse to crafting such exceptions
without Supreme Court guidance;270 perhaps it reflects courts’ general
reluctance to craft numerous exceptions to bright-line rules; perhaps courts
simply wish to avoid any negative perception associated with adopting formal
exceptions that limit First Amendment protections. Whatever the particular
balance of these (or other) contributing factors might be, the existence of
doctrinal distortion in this area of First Amendment doctrine is a sign of the
doctrine’s infirmities.
One might argue, however, that the present doctrinal framework is
correctly calibrated and the problem lies solely with judges’ reluctance to
apply it faithfully; that is, the theoretically best solution to this problem is for
judges to simply stop distorting doctrine in this manner and consistently apply
the default rule when it is called for. I do not doubt that, in the abstract, formal
268 The only benefit of such distortion is that it produces a greater number of “correct” answers—although
it does so in a particularly unconstrained and opaque manner.
269 Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 44, at 1017 (observing that his proposed doctrinal framework “depends on a
faith in doctrine and its ability to constrain judges, even in the worst of times and even against their own
impulses”).
270 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Without guidance from the
Supreme Court, a lower federal court should hesitate before extending the logic of Ferber to other types of
speech.”).
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doctrine has constraining power such that judges will sometimes decide cases
in a way they perceive as “incorrect” if that’s what the formal rule dictates. I
also do not doubt that the Supreme Court can play a meaningful role in
limiting particular distortions that may emerge in lower courts, as evinced in its
Reed opinion.271 But where, as here, courts—including the Supreme Court—
have consistently distorted doctrine to circumvent the formally applicable
rules, there is usually little reason to hope that they will suddenly change their
behavior. Adjusting the doctrine towards greater transparency might only be
the second-best solution to this problem of doctrinal distortion, but it may be
the more practical and realistic solution, and it certainly represents a superior
state of affairs to the current one.
2. Locating a Better Doctrinal Balance
Given that the distorting pressure in this area of First Amendment doctrine
is produced by the lack of fit associated with the categorical default rule of
strict scrutiny, a better doctrinal balance can be reached by introducing a
greater degree of transparent tailoring to the analysis. This approach was
touched upon by Justice Kagan in her opinion in Reed. Delving beneath the
doctrine to the underlying foundational reasons behind it, she observed that
because subject-matter regulations “may have the intent or effect of favoring
some ideas over others,” we generally “insist that the law pass the most
demanding constitutional test.”272 She argued, however, that when this sort of
danger “is not realistically possible”—such as in the case of reasonable sign
regulations—“we may do well to relax our guard so that ‘entirely reasonable’
laws imperiled by strict scrutiny can survive.”273 In Justice Kagan’s view, “We
can administer our content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common sense,
so as to leave standing laws that in no way implicate its intended function.”274
As Justice Breyer similarly observed in his concurring opinion, “The First
Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s
expressive objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than a
simple recitation of categories, such as ‘content discrimination’ and ‘strict
scrutiny,’ would permit.”275

271
272
273
274
275

See supra text accompanying notes 220–22.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2238 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Such increased tailoring of the doctrine would relieve the substantial
tension created by the bluntness of the current strict scrutiny default rule,
which would in turn reduce the risk of doctrinal distortion on the part of
courts.276 At the same time, it would introduce greater transparency to the
analysis, with all of the associated benefits. By limiting, in a forthright manner,
the most dissonant applications of the rule, increased tailoring would make it
easier for courts to apply the established rules consistently in all
circumstances.277
To be clear, to say that a move towards greater doctrinal tailoring would
remedy the current doctrinal imbalance is not to say that maximal tailoring—
whether in the form of a completely open-ended balancing analysis or a highly
voluminous set of exceptions—is the desired goal; such approaches have their
own substantial costs.278 It is only to say that the way to fix the present
doctrinal imbalance is to push the doctrine incrementally towards the more
open and transparent side of the spectrum; how strong this push must be is a
harder question to answer in the abstract.279
On a more practical level, what might this doctrinal shift towards more
tailoring and greater transparency look like? It could perhaps take the form of
an increased willingness of courts to carve out explicit categorical exceptions
to the default rule of strict scrutiny, to which some less onerous standard of
review—like intermediate scrutiny—would apply. Although the Supreme
Court has occasionally carved out such categories—most notably, in the

276 Indeed, this is the same underlying rationale for the Court’s recognition of categorical low-value
speech exceptions to the default rule. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
277 Cf. Stone, supra note 266, at 195 n.24 (“[T]he low value theory acts as a safety valve, enabling the
Court to deal sensibly with potentially harmful but relatively ‘unimportant’ speech without diluting the
protection accorded expression at the very heart of the guarantee.”).
278 See Schauer, supra note 266, at 1199–200 (observing that “[t]he more separate categories there are
within the first amendment, . . . the more complex and cumbersome the full corpus of first amendment doctrine
becomes,” and outlining the costs of such complexity, such as increasing the likelihood of mistakes and
rendering the doctrine incomprehensible to “non-legally trained front line” officials).
279 Some have argued that the addition of greater doctrinal flexibility in individual rights cases “cannot be
confined to the situations for which it was envisioned, and therefore will over time produce unacceptable
results in other cases.” Bhagwat, supra note 44, at 999; see also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 873–74
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“This case reaffirms that . . . the balancing test cannot be and will not be
contained to apply only to those ‘hard’ cases . . . involving the question of the power of this country to
preserve itself.”). But as discussed above, the particular doctrinal distortions that courts create in order to reach
their desired results can similarly infect doctrine elsewhere. As between the two evils posed in these contexts,
it seems preferable to err on the side of doctrinal transparency, since any steps down the slippery slope will at
least be openly broadcast rather than smuggled under the surface of formal doctrine.
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context of content-based regulations of truthful commercial speech280—such
carve-outs have been rare, despite the broad range of cases where applying
strict scrutiny in its pure form would lead to anomalous or dissonant results.
Thus, courts might explicitly carve out certain “middle-value” categories of
speech—such as, for example, sexually explicit speech, or false statements of
fact, or detailed factual instructions for dangerous or illegal behavior—as
exceptions to the default rule such that intermediate scrutiny applies to
content-based regulations.281 Because, under this system, the basis for the
differential treatment of such speech would be explicitly delineated, it would
represent a far more transparent approach than the current one, in which courts
have surreptitiously distorted doctrine to reach their desired results.
Or, perhaps, this sort of doctrinal adjustment can be achieved by adjusting
the default rule itself. The tension created by the traditional strict scrutiny rule
lies in the fact that the rule applies as a default to all residual speech that does
not fall into a specifically designated category of lower-value speech. In other
words, unless a court can fit the speech within one of these categories—which
the court may be disinclined to do for the reasons stated above282—current
doctrine requires it to apply strict scrutiny to any content-based restrictions of
the speech. This pressure would be alleviated, however, if the doctrine instead
called for courts to (1) explicitly identify and carve out categories of
high-value speech, just as they do with low-value speech categories; (2) limit
the application of strict scrutiny to content-based speech restrictions only to
those categories of speech; and (3) apply intermediate scrutiny as the default
rule for all remaining residual speech.283 Under such a regime, the default rule
facing courts in difficult cases dealing with content-based speech restrictions
would not be the onerous and potentially ill-fitting strict scrutiny standard, but
rather the more open-ended and transparent intermediate scrutiny standard.
Such an approach can be viewed as effectively formalizing and bringing out
into the open what courts have already been doing implicitly through doctrinal
distortion.
Each option has its advantages and disadvantages, which I will not dwell
on for present purposes. But the case law suggests that the current doctrinal
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approach pushes too far in the direction of categorical rules at the expense of
transparency and flexibility, and that some form of doctrinal adjustment is
warranted. And indeed, current members of the Court have openly agitated for
this sort of change, as reflected by Justice Kagan’s call for “a dose of common
sense” in her Reed concurrence,284 Justice Ginsburg’s argument against the
application of strict scrutiny in Williams-Yulee,285 and Justice Breyer’s
repeated characterization of the “tiers of scrutiny as guidelines informing our
approach” rather than “tests to be mechanically applied.”286 The incremental
benefits associated with the increased transparency brought by such
adjustments would be substantial, and such benefits are obtainable at a
comparatively limited cost to predictability and consistency.
CONCLUSION
Designing doctrine to effectuate the First Amendment’s protection of free
speech is a difficult undertaking. Neither the Free Speech Clause itself287 nor
the historical record surrounding its ratification provide much in the way of
guidance,288 and courts and commentators cannot even agree on the underlying
theoretical rationales behind the Constitution’s mandate that speech be entitled
to special protection.289 As a result, courts often approach First Amendment
issues narrowly and incrementally, focusing on resolving the specific case at
hand while glossing over broader considerations of doctrinal design.290
This incremental approach to First Amendment jurisprudence, however,
has its costs. As Schauer has elegantly stated,
We would hardly think it appropriate to design a building by deciding
beam by beam, pillar by pillar, and brick by brick, as we went along,
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what the building was to look like. Instead the building’s structural
integrity depends on a design at the beginning, a design that looks to
the full shape of the completed structure. . . .
....
. . . [W]e may discover that the consequences of incremental
doctrinal design are quite similar to the consequences of incremental
architectural design.291

Of course, constructing doctrine is not the same as constructing a building.
Particularly in an area of doctrine as potentially expansive and complex as the
First Amendment, we cannot possibly foresee every potentially relevant factor
and design an elegant and complete doctrinal edifice in advance.292 But the
metaphor serves as a useful reminder that courts, in crafting First Amendment
doctrine, should not lose sight of the doctrine’s normative superstructure—the
foundational reasons why we attribute value to speech and our judgments as to
how this value ought to be measured against different types and degrees of
social harm. This normative superstructure represents the broad design of the
doctrinal edifice being built, and doctrinal transparency is a vital means of
ensuring that these foundational intuitions and judgments do not fade into the
background.
Of course, the benefits associated with doctrinal transparency must always
be balanced against many other normative and practical considerations in
constructing doctrine. But it is vital that courts carefully consider the true costs
of adopting opaque approaches. It is certainly possible, maybe even likely, that
we will never fully agree as to what the overarching blueprint for First
Amendment doctrine ought to look like. But if there is any chance of building
a coherent First Amendment jurisprudence—an elegant and balanced doctrinal
edifice—then articulating, revisiting, and grappling with these foundational
intuitions and judgments will be a necessary and important part of that process.

291

Id.
Id. (“Naturally, common law development, as apt a characterization as any for what the courts do with
respect to the first amendment, cannot design the edifice in advance.”).
292

